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Constitutional Considerations:
Government Responsibility and the
Right Not to be a Victim
Richard L. Aynes*
Within a democratic society, citizens are provided with certain rights
and liberties. Among those rights and liberties is the right not to be a vic-
tim. In this article, the author examines and analyzes the growing concern
for the protection of victims of crimes. Recent legislative enactments have
been designed to alter the role of the victim in the civil and criminal justice
systems by defining and implementing a series of "victims' rights." The au-
thor concludes by recognizing that one of the most important duties of gov-
ernment is to provide for the physical safety of those within its
jurisdiction. To implement this duty, the interest and consequential stand-
ing of the victim must be recognized within the American court system.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an era of increasing concern over crime and the growth of
government agencies into bureaucratic institutions which may
not readily respond to individual needs, support for legislative
and private actions to establish and protect the rights of the vic-
tims of criminal acts has blossomed. These actions generally fall
into two categories: those which are directed at making the vic-
tim "whole" by compensation, medical aid, and other similar pro-
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grams; and those directed at requiring government employees,
including prosecutors, police officers, and judges to share more in-
formation with the victim, to involve the victim in the criminal
justice process, and to treat the victim in a more courteous and
dignified manner.1
These concerns appear to have originated in modern times as a
result of the women's rights movement and its efforts to protect
the welfare of rape victims.2 Such efforts were often initiated in
the form of private help-groups that offered counseling, shelter,
and support. These efforts quickly expanded to include public ac-
tions such as reform in the manner in which rape cases were
"processed" 3 and the enactment of rape/shield laws establishing
limitations on cross-examination about past sexual experiences. 4
With the movement to protect rape victims as a guide, concern
for the victims of crimes spread to include other identifiable
groups, particularly the elderly and victims of domestic violence,
causing the enactment of similar private and public programs.5
These types of programs convinced many that there was a need to
1. "Such services may be summed up concisely as treating the victim like a
human being and not merely as a witness in some future criminal proceeding."
Carrington, Victims' Rights Litigation?: A Wave of the Future, 11 U. RICH. L. REv.
447, 451 (1977).
2. Sources giving credit to the women's rights movement for this accomplish-
ment are voluminous. See, e.g., Kneedler, Sexual Assault Law Reform in Vir-
ginia-A Legislative History, 68 VA. L. REV. 459, 461 and sources cited at n.5
(1982).
3. For example, the reform of the laws pertaining to sexual assault in Vir-
ginia was said to have been obtained as a result of a seven year "grassroots" citi-
zens' effort initiated by the Virginia Committee on Sexual Assault Reform and
carried on by the Virginia State Crime Commission's Task Force on Criminal Sex-
ual Assault. See generally id.
However, many of the private efforts received financial support from the federal
government through Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grants. See
A.B.A. Section of Criminal Justice, Bar Leadership on Victim Witness Assistance 6
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Bar Leadership I. Indeed, the Justice System Im-
provement Act of 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 3701, amended the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 and specifically authorized the Law Enforcement Assist-
ance Administration (LEAA) to make grants in the witness/victim area for the
purpose of "[d] eveloping and implementing programs which provide assistance to
victims, witnesses, and jurors, including restitution by the offender, programs en-
couraging victim and witness participation in the criminal justice system, and pro-
grams designed to prevent retribution against or intimidation of witnesses by
persons charged with or convicted of crimes." 42 U.S.C. § 3741(a)(12) (1979).
4. Since 1974, forty-six states have enacted "rape shield" statutes which place
limitations upon the admission of evidence concerning past sexual conduct.
Kneedler, supra note 2, at 488-89. See also FED. R. Ev-D. 412. These changes are
consistent with policy adopted by the ABA House of Delegates at the Mid-Year
Meeting in February of 1975 calling for "[r[ evision of the rules of evidence relating
to cross-examination of the complaining witness .... The full resolution is re-
printed in ABA Section of Criminal Justice, Victim/Witness Legislation: Consider-
ations for Policymakers 86 [hereinafter cited as Considerations ].
5. "Special victim" legislation has included protection for the elderly, chil-
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offer greater protection to all victims of crime. In recent years
this concern has resulted, not only in a number of legislative en-
actments dealing with matters such as victim compensation,6 but
also in more comprehensive bills at both the state7 and federal
levels designed to significantly alter the role of the victim in the
civil and criminal justice systems by defining and implementing a
series of "victims' rights." Those legislative enactments are com-
mendable because they attempt to bring about long over-due re-
forms. As positive as those efforts may be, however, they
overlook, and may even obscure, the most fundamental right of
all: the right not to be a victim. "It is all very well to counsel and
compensate a victim who has been hit on the head, but the
chances are that he would rather not have been hit on the head in
the first place."9 It is that right, and the remedies for its violation,
that this article seeks to explore.
II. INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS
It should be axiomatic that everyone has a "right" not to be vic-
timized. Both criminal and civil law proscribe certain conduct.
The violation of a law is not only an offense against society but is
also an invasion of the personal rights of the victim. Conse-
quently, it would be suprising if anyone would contest the asser-
tion that when one is victimized he has the right to seek
vindication under the law. In the context of criminal law, this
principle is recognized under the general theory that the state, as
the surrogate for the victim, may initiate prosecution. In the civil
context, this is recognized by the right to institute civil action to
dren, women, the handicapped, teachers, and police. This type of legislation is
surveyed in Considerations, supra note 4, at 59-76.
6. Compensation programs for the victims of violent crimes currently exist in
thirty-four states. An overview of these programs can be found in Considerations,
supra note 4, at 2-16. See also Clark & Webster, Indiana's Victim Compensation
Act: A Comparative Perspective, 14 IND. L. REV. 751 (1981) (comparing statutes of
Indiana, New York and Minnesota); Hoelzel, A Survey of 27 Victim Compensation
Programs, 63 JUD. 485 (1980); Annot., 20 A.L.R. 4th 63 (1983).
7. "Cluster" legislation to provide comprehensive assistance to victims and
witnesses is surveyed in Considerations, supra note 4, at 25-28. Topics covered
are: (1) victim/witness notification; (2) protecting witnesses from intimidation; (3)
property return; (4) ombudsman for the victim; (5) counsel for the victim; (6) vic-
tim impact on criminal justice proceedings; (7) use of depositions; (8) witness
compensation; and (9) employers' obligations.
8. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248
(1982).
9. Carrington, supra note 1, at 468.
seek compensation for injuries. There is now a growing trend in
the civil context to seek recovery from third parties whose negli-
gence may have given the criminal the opportunity to commit the
crime, as well as from the actor who committed the offense.10
What may not be quite so clear is that just as each individual
has a duty not to violate the criminal and civil laws, the govern-
ment has a separate and independent duty to protect those under
its jurisdiction from becoming the victims of crime. As an ab-
stract proposition, almost everyone might agree that police forces
are established to protect the people and that one of the first du-
ties of any government is to offer adequate physical protection to
its constituents. Yet courts have been reluctant to translate that
theory into practice. Frequent examples exist where the courts
hold that there is no enforceable duty on the part of the govern-
ment to protect those living under its jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, for example,
has held that the "government and its agents are under no gen-
eral duty to provide ... police protection to any particular individ-
ual citizen."" The Supreme Court of California has held that
where there was no "special relationship" between the police and
a victim, the police are under no duty to warn the victim of poten-
tial danger.' 2 Perhaps the boldest declaration of this kind is by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: "But
there is no constitutional right to be protected by the state
against being murdered by criminals or madmen."13
Victims have been no more successful in securing satisfaction
from reluctant government actors. Attempts to resort to judicial
remedies to force unwilling government employees to arrest or
prosecute those who are alleged to have violated the rights of a
victim have been uniformly unsuccessful. For example, in Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., 14 the United States Supreme Court held that
the mother of a child did not have a sufficient interest to obtain
standing to require the prosecutor to prosecute the child's father
for failure to support the child. In the course of its holding, the
10. E.g., Comment, Negligence Liability for the Criminal Acts of Another, 15 J.
MAR. L. REv. 459 (1982); Carrington, Victims' Rights: A New Tort, 14 TRIAL MAG. 39
(June 1978).
11. Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 3 (App. D.C. 1981) (en banc)
quoting with approval the decision of the trial court below which is also repro-
duced, in part, as an appendix to the court's opinion. The quoted portion of the
district court's opinion appears at 444 A.2d at 4.
12. Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d 894, 185 Cal. Rptr.
252 (1982).
13. Bowers v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982). See also Weiner v. Met-
ropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 N.Y.2d 175, 433 N.E.2d 124, 448 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1982).
14. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
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Court concluded that "a private citizen lacks a judicially cogniza-
ble interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another."1 5
Victims have been equally unsuccessful in preventing the release
of offenders who are thought to be dangerous, or in recovering
damages from state officials when such released individuals com-
mit further crimes.
An examination of the response of victims to the current results
of the American system of justice shows discontent. Increasing
numbers of suits against law enforcement agencies and their em-
ployees for the failure to provide protection; 16 suits against third
parties who failed to take precautions that would have prevented
crimes; 17 suits against governmental agencies for the release of
prisoners and mental patients who subsequently commit
crimes;18 and an increasingly militant victims' rights movement
are all indications of public discontent with the present system.
While some may suppose that the enactment of legislation to
guarantee the "rights" of victims will address their major con-
cerns, such legislation may not affect the underlying problem. In
spite of the oft-repeated complaint that accused defendants have
rights and the victims have none, the victims' rights movement
has not, to any great extent, addressed itself to the perpetrator of
the crime.' 9 In certain instances there may be calls for increasing
15. Id. at 619.
16. E.g., Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (App. D.C. 1981); DeLong v.
County of Erie, 89 A.D.2d 376, 455 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1982).
17. E.g., Comment, supra note 10; Smith, The Landlord's Duty to Defend His
Tenants Against Crime on the Premises, 4 WHrITIER L. REV. 587 (1982); Note, Tort
Lau-Merchant's Duty to Protect Invitees from Third Party Criminal Acts, 4
CAMPBELL L. REV. 411 (1982); Winter, Hinckley's Life, Time Mag., Mar. 28, 1983 at
21; Note, Professional Obligation and the Duty to Rescue: When Must a Psychia-
trist Protect His Patient's Intended Victim?, 91 YALE LJ. 1430 (1982); see also Brad-
ley Center, Inc., v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. 1982) (criminal act of mental
patient was forseeable and death was proximately caused by private hospital's
negligence in issuing an unrestricted weekend pass).
18. Holmes v. Wampler, 546 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Va. 1982) (former mental pa-
tient stabbed plaintiff five weeks after release from institution); Martinez v. Cali-
fornia, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (plaintiff's decedent, a 15 year-old girl, was killed by
parolee five months after release).
19. This conclusion is based not only upon an analysis of the state and federal
legislation enacted, supra notes 4-8, but also upon the major writings in this area.
A notable exception is Frank G. Carrington's THE VICTIMS (1975), which argues for
increased protection by advocating more stringent penalties for convicted
criminals and for a reversal of certain Supreme Court interpretations of the Con-
stitution such as those requiring the exclusion of evidence illegally seized and giv-
ing a suspect "warnings" about his constitutional rights prior to interrogation. See
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384
penalties for specific crimes or for crimes against certain classes
of victims, but so far the most significant change affecting the sta-
tus of the convicted criminal has been the prevention of the crimi-
nal from profiting from the crime by writing books, selling movie
rights, or other similar activities. 20
Instead, most complaints are directed against agents of the gov-
ernment itself. For example, in attempting to identify the "prob-
lem," one ABA section included among eight examples of the
"average" witness'/victim's experience with the criminal justice
system the following:
1. Official indifference; 2. Adverse questioning by law enforcement of-
ficers who may feel that the victim is responsible for his victimization; 3.
"Perfunctory, summary and insensitive interviewing by prosecutors who
also may feel that the person has somehow 'asked' to be victimized;...."
4. Improper accommodations at the police station or court house; and 5.
Lack of clear explanations concerning the proceedings and decisions
made concerning the case.
2 1
The belief is that "[c]ontrary to a current cliche, victims are not
so much forgotten by our criminal justice system as they are used
by it."'22
U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warnings). Consideration of what has been termed a
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule was the issue raised by the Court
when it set reargument in Illinois v. Gates, No. 81-430. But, "With apologies to all,"
a decision was rendered in that case without reaching the issue. 103 S. Ct. 2317
(1983). Recently certiorari was granted in other cases which raise this issue. E.g.,
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E,2d 725, cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
3534 (1983); United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct.
3535 (1983).
20. E.g., Comment, Alabama's Anti-profit Statute: A Recent Trend in Victim
Compensation, 33 ALA. L. REV. 109 (1981).
21. Bar Leadership, supra note 3, at 1. Elsewhere reference is made to "indif-
ferent, coldly bureaucratic, and arrogant treatment of victims and witnesses." Id.
at 9. That same document talks of "shabby and indifferent treatment for crime vic-
tims and witnesses" and speaks of the need to ensure "that all who work within
our criminal justice institutions are frequently reminded that they are public ser-
vants and that victims and witnesses are treated as 'clients' of the criminal justice
system." Id. See also id. at 16 ("arrogant scheduling practices").
22. Id. at 2. The effects of dealing with government agencies after the crime is
often referred to as "secondary victimization." See, e.g., Goldstein, Defining the
Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 Miss. L.J. 515, 524 (1982).
Many of those advocating reform to increase the status of victims in the justice
system offer as at least one of the reasons for such reform that it will increase vic-
tim cooperation in the prosecution of crime. E.g., id. at 518, 526, 528 (1982). See
also Bar Leadership, supra note 3, at iii, 9, 31. Many of the statutory provisions
concerning victims seem to be based upon this goal.
For example, the proposal of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws' Uniform Crime Victims Reparation Act provides that generally
an award will not be made unless the incident was reported to "a law enforcement
officer" within 72 hours after the occurrence, and further, that the amount of any
reward may be reduced or denied if the victim fails to "fully" cooperate with law
enforcement agencies. Unif. Crime Victim's Rep. Act §§ 5(a), 5(e), reprinted in
Considerations, supra note 4, at 76 (1981). Many of the statutes providing for med-
ical examination and treatment of victims of sexual offenses stipulate that such
services are available only when they are rendered in connection with gathering
[Vol. 11: 63, 1984] The Right Not to be a Victim
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Thus, the bulk of the victims' rights legislation has been to im-
prove the victim's status vis-a-vis the government itself, and not
with respect to the criminal. This is significant because it mirrors
the fact that the bulk of witnesses' complaints do not involve the
laws which make certain conduct criminal, the sanctions for vio-
lating such laws, or, to a large extent, even the punishment ulti-
mately meted out to the one convicted. Rather, the complaints
focus on the treatment that the individual receives from the gov-
ernment employees who are, at least in democratic theory, his
own employees.
Professor Kelly's study of the reaction of certain rape victims to
their experience in the criminal justice system provides com-
ments that are instructive: "[T]hey should have let me partici-
pate. It happened to me. I'm furious they never had the decency
to let me say anything about what I wanted."23
I was treated like a nonentity . . . the U.S. Attorney took the case and
moved me right out of the picture. He didn't even ask me my opinion. He
told me what he had decided. I felt like the criminal, like I was cluttering
the picture with this rape. 24 What the offender has done to the individual
is swept under the rug. The only reason they took my case was because
he had a record and because they were worried about what he might do to
"society." What about me? What did they do to help me? Nothing!2 5
While anecdotal, these concerns appear to be representative of
the feelings of many victims.
Moreover, although not expressed in those terms, these feelings
on the part of victims reflect a deeper problem than lack of partic-
ipation. They reflect a problem that the victim may instinctively
feel and yet, because of the evolution of our society, may not be
able to articulate. That feeling can be intellectualized and histori-
information about a crime for subsequent prosecution. Id. at 74. Similarly, the
newly enacted Federal Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, while appar-
ently decrying the fact that victims are often "simply used as tools to identify and
punish offenders" begins with a finding that "[wlithout the.cooperation of victims
and witnesses, the criminal justice system would cease to function." Victim and
Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 2(a)(1), 96 Stat. 1248 (1982).
It is possible that these are simply identifications of incidental effects from vic-
tim legislation or even that the benefit of victim cooperation is being used as a
"selling point" to those who may be otherwise reluctant to endorse or enact such
legislation. However, it is also possible that the concern is still with using the vic-
tim as a "tool" for state policy, rather than a concern for the victim as a person.
23. Kelly, Victims' Reaction to the Criminal Justice Response 7 (June 6, 1982)
(paper prepared for delivery at the 1982 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society
Association).
24. Id. at 24.
25. Id. at 27.
calized in the following terms: If I were living in a more primitive
society I would have taken steps to protect myself from this crime
and, failing in that attempt, to punish the offender who harmed
me. But the government assured me that I need not defend my-
self by carrying a weapon, and indeed may have made this illegal,
by living in a fort, or by acting with others to form feudal alliances
for self-defense. Further, I was assured that an injury to me was
also an injury to society and that consequently the government
would vindicate my rights by punishing anyone who injured me.
Now, having failed to protect me from injury, the government fails
to redress my injury because it apparently feels that its own in-
jury has not been that great, and it uses its criminal law to pro-
hibit me from resorting to self-help.
Professor Kelly's description of what happens once the crime is
reported to the authorities has a double meaning which describes
not only the victim's actual experience, but also the historical pro-
gression under which the victim lost control of the punishment of
the assailant: "[WIhat was once a personal, private matter be-
comes the business of strangers, to be handled mainly as they see
fit."26
This articulation of a theory of justification for the underlying
discontent of victims suggests a final legal conclusion: that the
government and its employees may have breached the "social
contract" with the people within its jurisdiction. The continuing
breach of this contract during a time of rising concern over crime
can only result in an increasing escalation of private responses to
crime. In times of perceived ineffective law enforcement Ameri-
can culture has historically produced vigilante action. While such
illegal activity may be seen as simply a contest between "good
guys" and "bad guys," the government's breach of the social con-
tract may provide a more sophisticated justification for such ac-
tions: by failing to live up to its part of the bargain the
government releases the people from any moral obligation to ad-
here to its laws or processes. 27
Indeed, those arguing that the second amendment confers a
personal right to bear arms for the purposes of self-defense often
26. Id. at 2.
27. Thomas Hobbes indicated that when internal war resulted in "no farther
[sic] protection of Subjects in their loyalty; then is the Common-wealth DIS-
SOLVED, and every man at liberty to protect himself by such courses as his own
discretion shall suggest unto him." T. Hobbes, LEVIATHAN (J. Plamonatz, ed.), pt.
II, ch. 29 at 178 (1651; 1914 edition; 1940 reprint.)
See also United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151):
"Where crime is committed with impunity . . . those unprotected by other sanc-
tions . . . [are] compelled ... to rely upon physical force for the vindication of
their natural rights. There is no other remedy and no other security."
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cite cases such as Warren v. District of Columbia2 8 as examples of
the government's lack of liability for the failure to provide protec-
tion. This failure on the government's part leads to the conclu-
sion that the citizens must necessarily have the right to preserve
their own lives by using weapons in self-defense. 29
One indication of a movement in this direction can be seen by
the rise of relatively benign citizens' anti-crime groups such as
the "Guardian Angels."30 There are also reports of about-to-be
victims using deadly force to prevent crimes, even in situations
where the law does not authorize such force.31 Similarly, a signifi-
cant increase in the development and use of private security
forces has been noted.32
Although not completely explanable in these terms it does
seem that the existence of such citizen groups, and the rise in ille-
gal self-help remedies, are in proportion to the perception that the
government is not properly fulfilling its role as the protector of
the innocent and the punisher of the criminal. While not sug-
gesting that we are near the return of widespread vigilante action
such as existed at certain times in our history, or as is alleged to
exist in certain other countries today, it should be recognized that
it is a small step from the lawful use of citizens groups to aid law
enforcement officials to illegal actions by such groups to punish
perceived offenders.33
28. 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. App. 1981) (en banc).
29. E.g., Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the Predilection
of Judges Reign?, 7 OKLA. Crry U. L. REV. 65, 93 n.136 (1983); Gardiner, To Preserve
Liberty-A Look at The Right To Keep And Bear Arms, 10 No. Ky. L. REV. 63, 65-
66, n.ll (1982).
30. See generally Comment, Municipal Liability for Torts Committed by Vol-
unteer Anti-Crime Groups, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 595-98 (1982) (for references to
the increase in such activity and an account of the Guardian Angels in New York
City).
31. E.g., Hoiles, Alleged shoplifter slain by store owner, Akron Beacon J., Feb.
24, 1983, at 1, col. A-1. It was reported that a man who attempted to walk out of a
neighborhood grocery store without paying for $9.98 worth of groceries was
stabbed several times by the store owner with a knife from the meat counter. The
owner was charged with murder. See also Street Sentence, Vigilante Justice in
Buffalo, Time Mag. 15 (August 15, 1983) (man suspected of sodomizing a ten year
old girl was stabbed and beaten by her father and neighbors).
32. People v. Zelinski, 24 Cal. 3d 357, 365-66, 594 P.2d 1000, 1004-05, 155 Cal. Rptr.
575, 579-80 (1979).
33. Though the prevention of such illegal activity may be one of the by-prod-
ucts of improving the status of the victim, it is not presented here as the motiva-
tion for such action. Rather, the discussion which follows advocates the changes
as part of the legal right of the victim as a person and not merely as a strategy to
forestall illegal activity.
III. THE VICTIM'S INTEREST: SUFFICIENT FOR STANDING
A starting point for unraveling the underlying problem is a real-
ization that there is a fundamental inconsistency between reality
and the Supreme Court's assertion that the victim of a crime has
no "interest" in the punishment of the one who violated the law.
Section IV of this article sets forth, in some detail, the basis for
the belief that the government has a duty to protect those within
its jurisdiction. Such a conception may be based upon a social
contract theory, natural law, or the fourteenth amendment. Of
course, the social contract may have been rewritten, and there
may be disputes as to whether the natural law of the eighteenth
century is the natural law of the twentieth. Compliance with the
fourteenth amendment, however, still stands as the constitutional
obligation of the state. If one accepts the view that the fourteenth
amendment places upon the state a duty to protect its inhabit-
ants, then the government's duty to protect cannot be abandoned
without a constitutional amendment.
It is not disputed that in the early penal systems "the course of
justice was the exclusive domain of the victim himself or his
clan."34 The state's initial intrusion into the system was often to
regulate such private vengeance, not displace it.35 Trial by com-
bat, as a substitution for unregulated combat, might exemplify
such regulation.36 As the state took more and more control over
the criminal process, it told the victim that the injury was to both
the victim and the state and that the state would act as the surro-
gate of the victim. 37 Indeed, even some of the relatively modern
literature speaks of the view that "harm to the victim is also harm
to the state. ' 38
Today, however, the courts find the injury is solely to the state.
By a subtle transformation, that which was once the exclusive
province of the victim became the joint province of the victim and
the state and most recently was transformed into the exclusive
province of the state.39 Such a view may, in social contract terms,
34. Sebba, The Victim's Role in the Penal Process: A Theoretical Orientation,
30 AM. J. COMP. L. 217, 225 (1982).
35. Id.
36. See id. at 228.
37. For example, Blackstone indicated that: "treason, murder, and robbery are
properly ranked among crimes; since, besides the injury done to individuals, they
strike the very being of society; which cannot possibly subsist, where actions of
this sort are suffered to escape with impunity." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
5 (lst ed. 1769; facsimile reprint 1979).
38. N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 56 (1974).
39. One ultimate question may be what is the goal of the state? Is the state
attempting to provide a more efficient and safer mechanism through which the
objectives of the victim can be accomplished? Or is the state attempting to dis-
place the victim and pursue its own goals?
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PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
be seen as a breach of the initial agreement under which the state
was made a partner in the criminal justice process. It also ignores
the very real personal interest the victim has in both receiving
protection from the state and in having his rights vindicated by
the criminal process.
Of even greater importance, this view ignores the fact that the
interests of state employees conducting the case and those of the
victim may be drastically different:
[The] conflict between the state's and the victim's interest is frequent and
real. Prosecutors are more closely aligned with police, judges, and de-
fense attorneys than with victims. These actors share similar goals,
namely, to minimize the uncertainty of outcomes and dispose of as many
cases as fast as time and justice will allow. To do this, charges are
dropped, cases are dismissed, delays freely granted. Plea bargaining be-
comes the rule, full charges and trial the exception. In this push to dis-
pense justice with minimal time and resources, victims' interests are often
sacrificed. As the National District Attorney's Association put it, "Prose-
cutors are typically too pressed by time, heavy case loads, and crises to
reflect long on the situation of the crime victim."4 °
Because of these dual interests, it ignores reality to suggest, as
the Supreme Court has done, that the victim does not have suffi-
cient interest to sue on the basis of the lack of protection or en-
forcement. 41 The Court should, quite simply, admit its error and
recognize the standing of victims in such situations. In the event
of its failure to do so, there should be "little doubt" that standing
could be conferred by legislative action.42 Both Congress and
state legislatures should act promptly to do so.
40. Kelly, supra note 23, at 3 (footnotes omitted). This same point is made by
Goldstein, supra note 22, at 519, 555-56. It should nevertheless be recognized that
many prosecutors, such as Milwaukee's Michael McCann, have made great contri-
butions to and taken leadership roles in the protection of victims' rights.
41. Seven members of the present Court have expressed a great deference to
the interest of the victim in criminal proceedings. A majority composed of Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, recently
held that "in the administration of criminal justice, courts may not ignore the con-
cerns of victims." Morris v. Slappy, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 1617 (1983) (emphasis added).
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall have indicated that while the "interests" of
a victim in a particular case are not relevant to a decision on enforcing an estab-
lished constitutional right, id. at 1625 n.10, they are relevant to utilizing a court's
supervisory power to reverse on an error that was deemed to be harmless. United
States v. Hasting, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 1984 n.7 (1983) (Brennan and Marshall, J.J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
Though these cases involved consideration of the interest of the victim in avoid-
ing a retrial, those same concerns should apply afortiori to the question of com-
pelling prosecution. Certainly a victim has a greater interest in securing some
prosecution of an offender than in avoiding a re-prosecution which may neverthe-
less result in a new conviction.
42. Goldstein, supra note 22, at 552.
The fact that a constitutional obligation may exist, however,
does not necessarily mean that it will be enforced by judicial pro-
cess even if victims have standing. Early decisions of the
Supreme Court held that even though the Constitution created a
clear obligation on the governor of a state to extradite a fugitive
from justice,43 judicial remedies were unavailable to enforce such
a duty."
However, the application of this principle to the duty of protec-
tion based upon the fourteenth amendment would seem particu-
larly inappropriate. Congressman John Bingham, author of the
relevant section of the fourteenth amendment, frequently articu-
lated the abolitionist legal theory that while the Bill of Rights was
applicable to the states prior to the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, 45 the Constitution was defective because it provided
no enforcement mechanism against the states. 46 He cited Barron
v. Baltimore47 and indicated that he made the last revision of the
fourteenth amendment with that case in mind and with the intent
of making up for this deficiency by providing for enforcement
against the states. 48
The only remaining theory that could be utilized to properly
deny victims a judicial remedy is the political question doctrine.49
Although there may be political remedies for some of these viola-
tions, 50 issues concerning the breach of the duty of protection, or
prosecution, would not seem to come within the political question
doctrine because such determinations are not committed to an-
other branch of government, they are capable of judicial resolu-
tion using normal tort principles, and they are the very type of
issue normally resolved by the courts.
Finding standing and justiciable issues simply means that the
matter may be litigated in the courts. It does not, of course, deter-
mine who shall prevail in any given lawsuit or what standards of
liability should apply. Obviously the latter are particularly impor-
tant because they may have an effect upon the day-to-day per-
formance of government actors. Risks in the implementation of
these duties and rights include: (1) diversion of scarce resources
43. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, providing for the extradition of fugitives.
44. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107-10 (1860); Prigg v. Penn-
sylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615-16 (1842).
45. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
46. Id. at 2511.
47. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
48. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1871) (speech during debate on en-
forcement act explaining drafting of fourteenth amendment five years earlier).
49. For a summary of this doctrine see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See
also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUrIONAL LAw 71-79 (1978).
50. See discussion, infra, in the text accompanying notes 193-99.
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away from protection and into litigation; (2) creating incentive for
the violation of rights of criminal defendants; and (3) creating dis-
incentive to taking jobs as members of law enforcement. The
standards set forth below attempt to avoid these problems and, at
the same time, to provide an effective remedy for the victims
whose rights have been violated.
Because one's view of the government's duty to protect specific
individuals may drastically affect the victim's remedies when
such protection has not been forthcoming, the historical basis for
believing that the government does have a duty to protect those
under its jurisdiction will be examined. The implications of such
a duty in assessing remedies against state actors will then be ex-
plored in the following categories: (1) physical protection; (2) ar-
rest; (3) investigation; (4) prosecution; and (5) custody of
offenders. Finally, because the implementation of victims' rights
in these areas necessarily involves state government, the doctrine
of sovereign immunity will be examined.
IV. THE GOVERNMENT'S DUTY OF PROTECTION
A. Allegiance, Protection, and Reciprocity
The concept that the government owes a duty of protection to
its citizens is ancient. In a feudal society, the lord would offer
military protection to his vassals. The theory of social contract
was premised, in part, upon the view that in exchange for surren-
dering certain natural rights to society, the individual gained cer-
tain protections from society.51
The government's duty to protect was the quid pro quo for a cit-
izen's duty of allegiance. This idea was prominent in abolitionist
thought5 2 and played a significant role in legal theory of the 1860's
and 1870's. For example, in 1862, Lincoln's Attorney General, Ed-
ward Bates, issued an opinion which was largely devoted to a dis-
51. See generally SOCIAL CONTRACT; ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME AND ROUSSEAU
(E. Barker ed. 1962). See also Art. X, A Constitution or Form of Government for
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1780), reprinted in 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 841
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Massachusetts Const. of 1780] where it is stated that
an individual has a right to be protected by society and that "consequently" each
individual also "is obliged" to contribute towards that protection. See also N.H.
CONST. art. X (1784), reprinted in R. PERRY & J. COOPER, SOURCES OF OUR LIBER-
TIES 383 (1959) [hereinafter cited as PERRY], and VT. CONST. art. X (1777) 365. For
a modern treatment of the concept of social contract see R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 150-83 (1977).
52. See generally J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 48, 84-88, 317-18 (1965).
cussion of "the duty of allegiance and the right of protection...
[which] are correlative obligations, the one the price of the
other."5 3 A year later President Lincoln, in his order threatening
retaliation for the mistreatment of black soldiers by the Confeder-
acy, began with the proposition that "[i] t is the duty of every gov-
ernment to give protection to its citizens, of whatever class, color,
or condition, and especially to those who are duly organized as
soldiers in the public service." 54
These concepts often received judicial sanction. In Minor v.
Happersett,5 5 Chief Justice Waite, speaking on behalf of a unani-
mous Court, indicated: "Allegiance and protection are . . . recip-
rocal obligations. The one is a compensation for the other;
allegiance for protection and protection for allegiance." 56 Similar
sentiments have been reiterated in modern Supreme Court
cases.
57
Without mentioning any specific provisions of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court has, in other contexts, referred to a duty of
government to provide protection for its citizens. Justice White
called this the "most basic function of any government." 58 The
adverse effect of the Fair Labor Standards Act upon the availabil-
ity of police and fire protection was one of the major considera-
tions in National League of Cities v. Usery,5 9 which resulted in
the conclusion that the tenth amendment prohibited application
of that act to state governmental functions. Similarly, in Foley v.
Connelie,60 the Court, in explaining that police officers were at
the heart of the state governmental function, indicated that "po-
lice functions [fulfill] a most fundamental obligation of govern-
ment to its constituency."6 1 Thus, even without consideration of
53.' 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 382, 395 (1862). This opinion of Bates, as well as the sig-
nificance of the order of President Lincoln discussed below, was first brought to
my attention upon a reading of Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Rauol
Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651, 672 n.ll0 (1979).
54. VI THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 357 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
55. 88 U.S. 162 (1875).
56. Id. at 166. See also the introductory portions of the North Carolina Consti-
tution of 1776 indicating that "allegiance and protection, are in their nature, recip-
rocal, and the one should be refused when the other is withdrawn." This idea may
have had its antecedents in Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. la, 4b, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 382
(1608): "as the subject oweth to the King his true and faithful ligeance and obedi-
ence, so the sovereign is to govern and protect his subjects." Id.
57. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 345 (1954); United States v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 649 (1929). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211 n.10
(1982) (citing United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898)).
58. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
59. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). "[I1t is functions such as these which governments are
created to provide. . . ." Id. at 851.
60. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
61. Id. at 297. The relevancy of National League and Foley came to my atten-
tion through a reading of Willing, Protection by Law Enforcement: The Emerging
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the requirements of the fourteenth amendment, there is substan-
tial support for the proposition that both the state and federal
governments owe a duty of protection to those within their
jurisdictions.
B. The Fourteenth Amendment's Requirement of Protection
Section one of the fourteenth amendment contains the provi-
sion that no state shall "deny any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." It is true that Justice Holmes
once deprecated the efficacy of the equal protection clause by de-
nominating it the "usual last resort of constitutional argu-
ments."6 2 Since the 1950's, however, the equal protection clause
has become "an extremely viable constitutional tool of considera-
ble range and impact," and has been resorted to more frequently
than any other constitutional provision protecting individual
rights. 63 Nevertheless, the emphasis has generally been upon the
"equal" application of state policy to individuals in similar situa-
tions. While equal treatment was certainly an important concern
of those who framed the fourteenth amendment, the clause also
speaks of "the equal protection of the laws."64 It is this aspect of
the equal protection clause which has particular relevance to the
victims of crime.
The framers of the fourteenth amendment had before them a
lengthy history of the idea that governments have a duty to pro-
tect citizens. For example, Section 3 of the Virginia Bill of Rights
Constitutional Right, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1982). Although the title of that article
would suggest a kinship to the present writing, Mr. Willing does not canvass any
possible remedies for an individual who believes that his rights to protection were
not honored by government actors. Rather, his thesis is that "truly extreme state-
created rights of criminal defendants may violate the United States Constitution"
because they may hamper law enforcement efforts to provide a minimal level of
protection. Id. at 19, 21-22, 85, 99.
62. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
63. P. KAUPER AND F. BEYTAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS
875 (5th ed. 1980). See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Regents
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
64. U.S. CoNsT. am, XIV (emphasis added). Implicit in the prohibition of the
fourteenth amendment that no state "shall deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws" are two ideas: (1) the duty of government to
protect all persons in their civil rights, and (2) the equality of all persons before
the law. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 1 (1968).
For a summary of the debates of Congress on the meaning of the "protection"
aspect of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause see Avins, The
Equal 'Protection' of the Laws: The Original Understanding, 12 N.Y.L.F. 385
(1966).
of June 12, 1776, indicated that "[g] overnment is, or ought to be
instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the
people, nation, or community; ... "65 The most widely quoted
portion of the Declaration of Independence provides not only that
all men are created equal, but also that the purpose of govern-
ment is to "secure" inalienable rights which include life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness. 66 This obligation on the part of gov-
ernment was reiterated in the early Constitution of Massachu-
setts: "Government is instituted for the common good; for the
protection, safety, prosperity and happiness of the people ... *"67
"Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in
the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to
standing laws."68 While not universal, similar sentiments were
written into the early constitutions of many states. 69
Other state constitutional provisions suggest a duty of protec-
tion, although they may be read as placing more emphasis upon
"equality" than upon "protection." One provision for religious
freedom, which sometimes appeared, provided that all Christian
denominations "shall be equally under the protection of the
law."70 Similarly, other provisions indicated that a subject "ought
to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all in-
65. PERRY, supra note 51, at 311 (emphasis added).
66. Thomas Jefferson was even more explicit about the government's duty to
protect one from criminal acts:
Whereas, it frequently happens that wicked and dissolute men, resigning
themselves to the domination of inordinate passions, commit violations on
the lives, liberties and property of others, and, the secure enjoyment of
these having principally induced men to enter into society, government
would be defective in its principal purpose, were it not to restrain such
criminal acts....
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 218 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1903) (from the pream-
ble to the Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases Heretofore
Capital, 1788) (emphasis added).
67. MASS. CONST. art. VII (1780), reprinted in PERRY, supra note 51, at 375 (em-
phasis added). However, note that the same article proceeds to conclude that:
"Therefore the people alone have an incontestible, unalienable, and indefeasible
right to institute government; and to reform, alter or totally change the same,
when their protection, safety, prosperity and happiness require it .. " When
read in its entirety, this could be interpreted to support the view that the framers
of the provision contemplated a political, rather than a judicial, remedy for any
breach of the duty of protection. Similar provisions appear in N.H. CONST. art. X,
(1784), reprinted in PERRY, supra note 51, at 383, and in VT. CONST. art. VI (1777),
reprinted in PERRY, supra note 51, at 365.
68. MAss. CONST. art. V (1780), reprinted in PERRY, supra note 51, at 375.
69. N.H. CONST. art. XII (1784), reprinted in PERRY, supra note 51, at 383; PA.
CONST. art. VIII (1776), reprinted in PERRY, supra note 51, at 330; VT. CONST. art.
XIII (1777), reprinted in PERRY, supra note 51, at 365.
70. MAss. CONST. art. III (1780), reprinted in PERRY, supra note 51, at 375.
Identical language appears in the N.H. CONST. art. VI (1784), reprinted in PERRY,
supra note 51, at 383. A variation of that theme is found in the Maryland Constitu-
tion of 1776 which provided that all Christians "are equally entitled to protection
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juries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or
character."71
In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall indicated that
"[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right
of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever
he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to
afford that protection.. ,,72 In the early and oft-quoted case of
Corfield v. Coryell, 73 interpreting the interstate privileges and im-
munities clause,74 Justice Bushrod Washington listed as one of
the general headings of such privileges "[p]rotection by the gov-
ernment."7 5 President Jackson's veto message of the bill to
recharter the national bank indicated that "every man is equally
entitled to protection by law."76
Borrowing, as they did, from concepts of natural rights and
equality contained in the Declaration of Independence, it is not
surprising that the pre-Civil War abolitionists placed great em-
phasis upon the duty of protection by the government. This is es-
pecially true because a number of the leading grievances which
in their religious liberty." MD. CONST. art. XXXIII (1776), reprinted in PERRY,
supra note 51, at 349.
It is, however, often difficult to make distinctions between concepts of "equality"
and concepts of "protection." For example, Judge Chase, presiding on the circuit
in the trial of John Fries, leader of the "Fries Rebellion" in Pennsylvania was no
doubt stating a commonly-held belief when he told the prisoner, prior to sentenc-
ing: "Your government secures to every member of the community... an equal
security for his person and property .... " Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 932 (C.C.D.
Pa. 1800) (No. 5,127) (emphasis in original). Of course, Justice Chase indicated
that the government "secures," rather than it has a duty to secure, these rights.
However, the more relevant inquiry is whether the government could "equally se-
cure" such protection by offering no protection?
71. MASS. CONST. art. XI (1780), reprinted in PERRY, supra note 51, at 376. See
also N.H. CONST. art. XIV (1784) reprinted in PERRY, supra note 51, at 384 and MD.
CONST. art. XVII (1776), reprinted in PERRY, supra note 51, at 348.
72. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). This might be interpreted to indicate
support for an affirmative duty to pass laws to protect one from injury. However,
later the Chief Justice indicated that his concern was with a situation in which
"the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." Id. (empha-
sis added). Read in this context, it would appear that Justice Marshall was speak-
ing of the duty of the government to vindicate rights established by law and not a
duty to enact laws to protect rights.
73. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
74. U.S. CONST.. art. IV, § 2 provides: "The Citizens of each State shall be enti-
tled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
75. 6 F. Cas. at 551.
76. S. Doc. No. 180, 22d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1832). Note that the language is
"equally entitled to protection" and not "entitled to equal protection."
abolitionists harbored were directed against all governments,
both state and federal, in their failure to offer protection.
As stated by abolitionist theoretician Theodore Dwight Weld,
the rights denied to the abolitionists included:
the right to petition ravished and trampled by its constitutional guardians
.. . "the right of peaceably assembling" violently wrested- the rights of
minorities, rights no longer- free speech struck dumb-free men out-
lawed and murdered-free presses cast into the streets and their frag-
ments strewed with shoutings, or flourished in triumph before the gaze of
approving crowds as proud mementoes of prostrate law. 77
The rights of free blacks which were said to have been violated
included "the right to be secure in their persons, houses and
property, that is to receive protection of the laws, courts, and pub-
lic officials against lynch mobs, private violence, fraud, and cal-
umny . -.78 Consequently, even in the northern states, "[t]he
immediate need of the abolitionists. . . was for protection against
riot, arson, assault, and murder. ' 79
It was for these reasons that the statement in the Declaration of
Independence, that one of the purposes of government was to "se-
cure" the natural rights of life and property, played such a promi-
nent role in the speeches of abolitionist leaders such as Ohio
Congressman Joshua J. Giddings.80 The Declaration of Indepen-
dence's theme of protection was adopted word-for-word in the
platforms of the Republican Party in 185681 and 1860.82
77. Quoted in J. TENBROEK, supra note 52, at 125-26.
78. J. TENBROEK, supra note 52, at 125.
79. Id. at 37.
80. See id. at 144 n.8. Although William L. Garrison and Henry Ward Beecher
were prominent abolitionists, Joshua Giddings is perhaps one of the better known
"political abolitionists," i.e., abolitionists who saw politics as a method of treating
the evil. He served in Congress from 1838 to 1859 and was one of the small band of
Congressmen supporting John Quincy Adams in his fight against the "gag" rule.
Upon the death of Adams he was the generally recognized leader of the anti-slav-
ery forces in the House until the formation of the Republican party. In his last
speech in the House, where he traced the history of the anti-slavery struggle, he
indicated that members of the Republican Party believed "that the object and
duty of go-<ernments are to protect every human soul in the enjoyment of life, lib-
erty, and happiness." CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. Part 1, 343 (1859).
81. PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST THREE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTIONS OF
1856, 1860 AND 1864, 43 (C.W. Johnson ed. 1893) [hereinafter cited as PROCEED-
INGS]. The second resolve quotes the "all men are created equal" and "to secure
these rights" portions of the Declaration. Inclusion of these provisions is generally
attributed to Congressman Giddings who was a member of the platform commit-
tee. See, e.g., G. JULIAN, THE LIFE OF JOSHUA R. GIDDINGS 335 (1892); J. TENBROEK,
EQUAL UNDER LAW 136-37, 141 n.5 (1965).
82. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 81, at 131. Unlike the convention of 1856 where
these principles were adopted with seeming unanimity, there was controversy
over their adoption at the 1860 Chicago convention. It was only after Joshua Gid-
dings had walked out of the convention in protest and debate was reopened that
resolution number two, quoting the same language from the Declaration, was
adopted. Id., at 135-42; D. HOWE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN WHIGS
179 (1979).
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In the 1856 Philadelphia Convention, the Republican list of
grievances included the fact that "[mlurders, robberies, and ar-
sons have been instigated or encouraged, and the offenders have
been allowed to go unpunished."83 The "National Administration"
was "arrang[ed]" for its inaction and the Republicans announced
their "fixed purpose to bring the actual perpetrators of these atro-
cious outrages and their accomplices to a sure and condign pun-
ishment hereafter."84 Similar ideology was expressed in the call
for the improvement of rivers and harbors of a national character,
which was said to be "justified by the obligation of Government to
protect the lives and property of its citizens."8 5 In the 1860 Con-
vention, when addressing the rights of naturalized citizens, the
Republican Party platform indicated the Party was "in favor of
giving a full and efficient protection to the rights of all classes of
citizens." 86
It was this concept of "protection" that the framers of the four-
teenth amendment sought to enact into fundamental law. In the
words of one influential scholar who analyzed the connection be-
tween abolitionists' views and the fourteenth amendment:
Freemen, all men, were entitled to have their natural rights protected by
government. Indeed, it was for that purpose and that purpose only that
men entered society and formed governments.... The equal protection of
the laws is thus a command for the full or ample protection of the laws. It
is basically an affirmative command to supply the protection of the laws. 8 7
83. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 81, at 44.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 132 (resolution number 14).
87. J. TENBROEK, supra note 52, at 193-94 (emphasis added). Because the duty
of protection was thought to belong to all governments, the federal government
had a duty to protect these same natural rights. For example, in arguing that Con-
gress should abolish slavery in the District of Columbia because the failure to do
so denied the slave the right of property in one's self, abolitionist activist James G.
Birney argued that: "Congress is bound immediately to protect every person in
the district, in the enjoyment of everything that is his." Philanthropist, Mar. 4,
1836, at 3, col. 4, from Human Rights, an abolitionist periodical (quoted in Graham,
The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, II Systemiza-
tion, 1835-37, Wis. L. REV. 610, 643 (1950)).
Similar views were echoed in Congress almost thirty years later by Senator
Trumbull in announcing his intention to introduce a bill to enlarge the powers of
the Freedmen's Bureau. He indicated that the purpose of the bill was to "secure
freedom to all persons within the United States, and protect every individual in
the full enjoyment of rights of person and property and furnish him with means
for their vindication." As to Congress' role in such protection, Senator Trumbull
indicated: "I consider that under the constitutional amendment [thirteenth
amendment] Congress is bound to see that freedom is in fact secured to every
person throughout the land; he must be fully protected in all his rights of person
In analyzing the equal protection clause, the same author con-
cluded that protection is part of the "universal correlative of the
allegiance and obligation of obedience which the constitutional
system exacts."88
The equal protection of the laws is violated fully as much, perhaps even
more, by private invasions made possible through failure of government to
act as by discriminatory laws ....
The two parts of the phrase are . . . inseparable. Every violation entails
both an absence of protection and a denial of equality, at least where fun-
damental rights are at stake .... The states are forbidden to fail to carry
out their primary duty of protection; and, when carrying it out, are forbid-
den to fail to adhere to the standard of equality.
8 9
These concepts were codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which
provided, in part, that "citizens . . . of every race and color . . .
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States . . . to full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens ... -
These concerns were in the minds of the framers of the four-
teenth amendment when it was debated in Congress. As Profes-
sor Soifer has noted, the "political thought of the time" included a
widely held belief "that government owed a duty to afford reme-
dies" for the violation of natural rights.91 In reporting to Congress
the evils then existing, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
found that:
The feeling in many portions of the country towards emancipated slaves,
especially among the uneducated and ignorant, is one of vindictive and
malicious hatred. This deep-seated prejudice against color is assiduously
cultivated by the public journals, and leads to acts of cruelty, oppression
and murder, which the local authorities are at no pains to prevent or
punish. 9 2
Thus, whatever the legal efficacy of the government's affirma-
tive duty to protect prior to the fourteenth amendment, it seems
reasonably clear that one of the effects of that amendment was to
constitutionalize this doctrine. Indeed, Joseph Tussman and Ja-
cobus tenBroek opened their influential article on the equal pro-
tection clause with the observation that "the equal protection
and property. . . ." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1865-1866) (quoted in J.
TENBROEK, supra note 52, at 194-95).
88. J. TENBROEK, supra note 52, at 118.
89. Id. at 119 (emphasis added). According to tenBroek the same obligations
were thought to arise under the concept of due process. "[D]ue process was
viewed not merely as a restraint on governmental power but as an obligation im-
posed upon government to supply protection against private action." Id. at 121.
90. 14 Stat. 27, ch. 31, § 1 (1866). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1976).
91. Soifer, supra note 53, at 674.
92. Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, XVII 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1866) (quoted in Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial
Discrimination Under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Inter-
pretist Grounds, 80 MICH. L. REv. 462, 477 (1982)) (emphasis added).
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clause was designed to impose upon the states a positive duty to
supply protection to all persons in the enjoyment of their natural
and inalienable rights-especially life, liberty, and property-and
to do so equally."93
This interpretation is also supported by the statutes subse-
quently passed to enforce the fourteenth amendment. In the de-
bate over the Civil Rights Acts of 1871,94 repeated references were
made to the failure of the states to offer protection. Senator Pool
stated the belief that the incidents of citizenship included the
"absolute . . .right to personal liberty, personal security and per-
sonal property. . . the protection of which is the prime object for
which all governments are established."9 5 In speaking of the duty
to protect those rights Senator Pool indicated: "It is made, pri-
marily, the duty of the States to give the protection. Upon their
failure the national Government must intervene with its authority
in defense of the rights of its citizens."96
According to Ohio's Representative Perry:
Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not
.... In the presence of these gangs all the apparatus and machinery of
civil government, all the processes of justice, skulk away as if government
and justice were crimes and feared detection .... [The Fourteenth
Amendment] means, then, that the people of a State, with more or less
definite political and governmental relations, shall neither abridge nor
permit to be abridged those rights, deny nor fail to afford the equal protec-
tion of the laws to any persons. 9 7
In supporting passage of the act, James Garfield, then a member
of the House of Representatives, indicated:
I think the provision that the States shall not "deny the equal protection
of the laws" implied that they shall afford equal protection .... [E]ven
where the laws are just and equal on their face, yet, by a systematic mal-
administration of them, or a neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions,
a portion of the people are denied equal protection under them.98
It may be suggested that the fourteenth amendment and its im-
plementing legislation were directed at the evil of discrimination
against protected classes, or the exercise of fundamental rights.
A careful analysis, however, will reveal that both the explicit lan-
93. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAUF. L. REv.
341 (1949) (emphasis added).
94. 17 Stat. 13 (1872).
95. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 607 (1871).
96. Id.
97. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong. 1st Sess. 78, 80 (1871).
98. Id. at 153.
guage of many of the authorities and the underlying rights pro-
vided, at the very least, for security of person and property.
The framers of the fourteenth amendment would not have been
satisfied with the claim that the state government could be
equally negligent in failing to protect the lives of all citizens. In-
deed, in one of the early cases interpreting the fourteenth amend-
ment, Judge Woods, later to become a United States Supreme
Court Justice, held in United States v. Hall99 that the fourteenth
amendment:
prohibits the states from denying to all persons within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws . . . [by] the omission to protect, as well as
the omission to pass laws for protection. The citizen of the United States
is entitled to the enforcement of the laws for the protection of his funda-
mental rights, as well as the enactment of such laws. 100
These views of the fourteenth amendment are consistent with
modern legal thought. For example, the ABA Standards Relating
to the Urban Police Function, 101 endorsed by the Executive Com-
mittee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police,102 indi-
cate that "[t] he highest duties of government" include the duty to
"preserve life and property."1 0 3 A similar sentiment was ex-
pressed by Senator Strom Thurmond and recently quoted with
apparent approval by Attorney General William French Smith:
"[TJhe primary purpose of government is to protect its citizens
against foreign and domestic enemies-and domestic 'enemies'
include the common criminal."104 It thus seems that there is a
consensus that there is an affirmative duty upon government to
protect those under its jurisdiction. The implementation of that
duty is analyzed in the following sections.
V. PHYSICAL PROTECTION
As recognized by the ABA Standards Relating to the Urban Po-
lice Function, 105 "[m]ajor current responsibilities" of the police
include giving "aid [to] individuals who are in danger of physical
harm ... "106 There should be no doubt that a police officer who
99. 26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282).
100. Id. at 81 (emphasis added). Accord United States v. Mall, 26 F. Cas. 1147
(C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,712).
101. 1979 Approved Draft, I ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1982).
102. Id. at 22. This information appears within "Commentary on the Introduc-
tion of the Supplement" entitled STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE
FUNCTION containing the 1973 Approved Draft and published in 1973. However, it
is not contained in the 1974 issue of STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE nor the 1979 Approved Draft.
103. Id. at §§ 1.52 - 2.4(9).
104. Smith, Remarks of the Attorney General on Law Day, 34 S.C. L. REv. 247,
248 (1982).
105. Approved Draft, 1979, supra note 101.
106. Id. at §§ 1.30, 1-2.2 (c).
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has the ability to rescue a person from physical harm and fails to
do so is personally liable for monetary damages. The courts, how-
ever, have been generally unwilling to recognize any civil liability
on the part of law enforcement officers for failure to protect the
victim of a crime, even when there was a reasonable opportunity
to do so. It is generally thought that an officer's duty to enforce
the law is owed only to the general public and "that the breach of
such duty accordingly creates no liability on the part of the officer
to an individual who was damaged by the lawbreaker's
conduct."l0 7
Perhaps one of the most widely known cases of recent origin is
Warren v. District of Columbia, ' 0 8 in which a rooming house was
broken into by two male intruders. The intruders entered the
room of one victim who was raped and forced to engage in sod-
omy. 0 9 The other two women, who had been asleep in a room on
the next floor, heard screams and called the police dispatcher who
told them to remain quiet and assured them that the police would
arrive. The officers came to the scene, but failed to enter the
house to investigate and left when there was no answer to the
knock on the door. The two victims then placed a second call to
the police station. Although they were assured that the police
were on their way, this call was merely recorded as "investigate
the trouble" and no police were dispatched to the scene.110
Ultimately, the remaining two women were discovered by the
intruders. All three victims were taken to the apartment of one of
the intruders. Their ordeal there was described by the court of
appeals in the following terms: "For the next fourteen hours the
women were held captive, raped, robbed, beaten, forced to com-
mit sexual acts upon each other, and made to submit to the sex-
ual demands [of the captors] ."111
A civil suit against the officers and the District of Columbia was
predicated on negligence in the failure to assign a proper priority
to their first call; the failure of the police on the scene to follow
properly designated police procedures in investigation; and the
dispatcher's failure to send police in response to the second call.
The majority held there was no liability under the theory that "a
107. Annot., 41 A.L.R. 3d 700, 702 (1972).
108. 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. App. 1981) (en banc).
109. Id. at 2.
110. Id.
111. Id.
government and its agents are under no general duty to provide
public services, such as police protection, to any particular
citizen."11 2
Unfortunately, this case is not an unusual one. In many juris-
dictions recovery for police negligence is denied under the theory
of immunity.113 More often, however, liability is denied under the
theory that while the police may owe a "general" duty to protect
the public, that duty does not attach to allow any specific individ-
ual to claim such protection unless a "special relationship" has
been established. Under this view it has been held that there is
no liability where: police on a stakeout at the scene of several
stabbings failed to warn a woman when they spotted a suspect
who subsequently stabbed the woman;114 when police officers
failed to stop individuals from illegally drag racing and the plain-
tiff was subsequently injured when those individuals collided
with his automobile;" 5 when a detective failed to order four boys
in front of a shop to disperse and they later fire-bombed the
store;1 6 and where there was a "tardy" response to a call for help
by a victim of a sexual assault." 7 It has also been held that there
is no duty to warn motel employees of suspicious persons in a
motel parking lot;118 or to protect a woman from threats from her
estranged boyfriend.19
112. Id. at 3, quoting with approval the decision of the trial court below.
113. E.g., Jamison v. City of Chicago, 25 Ill. App. 3d 326, 323 N.E.2d 118, rev'd, 48
Ill. App. 3d 567, 363 N.E.2d 87 (1974) (individual's son warned police of father's irra-
tional behavior on several occasions and requested that the father be arrested; no
police action was taken and father later killed the plaintiff's decedent); Trezzi v.
City of Detroit, 120 Mich. App. 506, 328 N.W.2d 70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (city oper-
ated a "911" emergency number; victims called for help but, because an unjustifi-
ably low priority was assigned, police were not dispatched until one-and-one-half
hours later after the couple received injuries that resulted in their deaths).
114. Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d 894, 185 Cal. Rptr.
252 (1982).
115. Trautman v. City of Stamford, 32 Conn. Supp. 258, 350 A.2d 782 (1975).
116. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. City of Wichita, 217 Kan. 44, 536 P.2d 54
(1975).
117. Doe v. Hendricks, 92 N.M. 499, 590 P.2d 647 (1979).
118. Sapp v. City of Tallahassee, 348 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
119. Ross v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897
(1968).
There are cases in which such a special relationship has been found. E.g., De-
Long v. County of Erie, 89 A.D.2d 376, 455 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1982) (reliance on emer-
gency "911" operator's statement that police would respond so that she did not
summon help from village police or neighbors was enough to establish special re-
lationship); Florence v. Goldberg, 44 N.Y.2d 189, 375 N.E.2d 763, 404 N.Y.S.2d 583
(1978) (police assumed duty of providing school crossing guard and on the day
they failed to do so mother's child was struck by taxi cab); Silverman v. Fort
Wayne, 171 Ind. App. 415, 357 N.E.2d 285 (1976) (allegation that police promised
store owner protection against riot, provided it for a short time, and then withdrew
protection is enough to state a claim alleging special relationship); Schuster v.
City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 180 N.Y.S.2d 265, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958) (decedent
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These decisions are premised upon a number of erroneous as-
sumptions which, if corrected, would find a duty of protection and
resolve the issue of liability upon questions of breach of duty and
proximate cause. Many of the aforementioned cases are premised
upon the view that the government has no duty to any specific cit-
izen to offer protection. Given the history of the fourteenth
amendment, this is assuredly incorrect.120 Rather, the history of
that enactment shows that the failure to offer protection to the in-
dividual was one of the evils that the amendment was designed to
correct. Consequently, it is clear that the obligation, which ex-
tends to everyone within the jurisdiction of the government, was
intended for the vindication of individual rights.
Such a concept should come as no surprise. Normal tort princi-
ples often begin with a duty which is owed to the whole world.
For example, everyone owes a duty not to assault anyone else.
The fact that the same duty is owed to the whole world does not
mean that when it is breached towards a single individual recov-
ery cannot be had. Similarly, the owner of property that may
present an attractive nuisance, such as a gravel pit, owes a duty
to the whole world to place certain protections around the danger.
The fact that such a "general" duty exists does not mean that
when an individual suffers injury he cannot invoke the protec-
tions of the law.
Second, the cases often indicate that the individual cannot re-
cover because he did not "rely" upon the police in a specific situa-
tion. 12 ' Yet this ignores the "social contract" and its everyday
reenactment. Without quibbling over the facts of specific cases, it
can be safely said that people express reliance upon the estab-
lished police authorities to protect them every day when they fail
to carry weapons; fail to travel on the streets only with "allies"
who would protect them; and fail to take other similar defensive
who gave police information which led to arrest of dangerous fugitive, who re-
ceived threats on his life which he communicated to police and who was not given
police protection and subsequently killed, had "special relationship" extending
duty of protection to him). But see Morgan v. District of Columbia, 350 F. Supp.
465 (D.C. 1982), vacated, appellant's petition for rehearing granted, 452 A.2d 1197
(1982) (warnings by wife of police officer that he had threatened her with revolver,
coupled with officer's past conduct, made department negligent when it failed to
investigate threats and liable when officer killed his father-in-law, and wounded
wife, son, and a fellow officer).
120. See supra notes 51-104 and accompanying text.
121. Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d 894, 185 Cal. Rptr.
252 (1982).
action. To utilize an analogy to the television Western, the act of
giving up one's guns at the city limits is predicated upon the as-
surance that the town marshal will offer protection against unpro-
voked violence. 122
Third, an underlying fear in all of these cases is that if suits
were allowed, the treasuries of the various governmental units
would be adversely affected. For example, one of the reasons ad-
vanced by the Illinois Appeals Court in Jamison v. City of Chi-
cago, 123 in finding that police action was protected by the state
immunity statute, was that a finding otherwise would mean that
"municipalities would be exposed to limitless liabilities." 124 Simi-
larly, the District Judge in Warren v. District of Columbia 125 indi-
cated that the plaintiff's theory of liability would lead to results
that were "staggering."126 Apparently the results the court had in
mind included a belief that too much time and money would be
expended in the litigation of private claims and that employees of
the government would leave its service. 12 7
While these arguments are apparently of importance to the
courts, they should be unpersuasive in denying a victim recovery.
A simple question of policy is involved: who should bear the loss;
the government which was negligent in its protection or the vic-
tim who was completely innocent? In the rhetoric of the nine-
teenth century, to ask the question is to propound the answer:
since it is the government which could have prevented the loss
but failed to do so, it is the government which should bear the
loss.
Furthermore, the observations of the Supreme Court of Arizona
in Ryan v. State 128 may be instructive. The court recalled that in
122. The fact that the government has assumed the responsibility of offering
police protection may give rise to another theory of liability. In a number of differ-
ent contexts it is well established that even though one may not initially have a
duty to take a certain action, once one voluntarily assumes the duty, he is re-
quired to perform the task in a non-negligent fashion. See Note, Torts - Liability of
Water Company to Individuals for Failure to Furnish Water, 26 TEMPLE L.Q. 214
(1952); Cain v. Meade County, 54 S.D. 540, 223 N.W. 734 (1929) (county which con-
tracts with state to repair highway liable for failure to maintain even though state
had duty to maintain highway); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111
N.E. 1050 (1916) (third-party beneficiary to contract).
123. 48 Ill. App. 3d 567, 363 N.E.2d 87 (1977).
124. Id. at 570, 363 N.E.2d at 89 (quoting Justice Burman's concurring opinion in
Jamison v. City of Chicago, 25 Ill. App. 3d 326, 330, 323 N.E.2d 118, 122 (1977)).
125. 444 A.2d 1 (D.C. App. 1981) (en banc).
126. Id. at 8 (quoting Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 523, 456 P.2d 376,
381 (1969)).
127. 444 A.2d at 9. The dissenting opinion of Judge Kelly indicates that he
would recognize liability in this case, but that his theory still recognizes principles
of fault, proximate cause, and forseeability which would not result in an opening
of the "floodgates of litigation." Id. at 12 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
128. 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982) (holding that governmental immunity is
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1947 it recognized liability of members of the state highway patrol
for torts caused by negligence in the performance of their duties,
but that "law enforcement officers continue to perform their du-
ties."129 It indicated that when sovereign immunity was abolished
in 1963 there were "dire predictions" of the consequences to the
state, but "Arizona survived."130 It is entirely possible that these
fiscal concerns may prove exaggerated here as well.
Such an approach would make neither law enforcement officers
nor the agencies they work for insurers of the public safety. But
it would require officers and agencies to act reasonably in dis-
charging an acknowledged duty to protect individuals from
crime.131 Application of such principles of negligence to the War-
ren case may be instructive.
Had the crime been committed instantaneously, no claim of lia-
bility would arise. The duty to protect citizens from crimes does
not mean that a police officer must be at each residence to protect
its occupants. Similarly, if the calls had come to the police station
and the police had arrived at the scene after the commission of
the crime, no liability would attach. The police cannot be ex-
pected to do the impossible and their prompt arrival on the scene
would have been reasonable to the utmost extent; and thus, no
breach of duty would be found. Under the allegations in Warren,
however, it was claimed that the police were negligent in three re-
spects: failure to assign proper priority to the call for help; failure
to investigate properly at the scene of the crime; and failure to
dispatch help in response to the second call. If the trier of fact
had found that any of these allegations were true, there would be
a breach of the duty of protection.
necessary to avoid a severe hampering of a governmental function of thwarting of
established public policy).
129. Id. at 309, 656 P.2d at 598 (citing Ruth v. Rhodes, 66 Ariz. 129, 185 P.2d 304
(1947) (state highway patrol officer negligently collided with truck while respond-
ing to a call)).
130. Id.
131. This approach is consistent with the understanding gleaned from the legis-
lative history. For example, in discussing the Ku Klux Klan Act ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13,
ch. 22 (1872), Senator Edmonds indicated:
[Tihe duty of the Government to protect its citizens is not absolute in the
final sense; its duty to protect is that it will exhaust all the resources of its
power, by diligent and faithful and vigorous effort to preserve the liberties
and the rights of its citizens; and when it has done that it has performed
the full function of government ....
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 691 (1871) (quoted in Avins, The Equal "Protec-
tion" of the Laws: The Original Understanding, 12 N.Y.L.F. 385, 421-22 (1966)).
As noted in the dissent in Riss v. New York, 132 however, this
does not end the question. There still must be a showing that this
breach proximately resulted in injury to the plaintiff-had the po-
lice acted reasonably they would have been able to prevent the
crime. In Warren, taking the allegations of the complaint as true,
this would seem to have the following results: no liability for fail-
ure to stop the initial breaking and entering; no liability to the
one victim who was initially assaulted in the home; but liability
would attach for the subsequent crimes which could have been
prevented if the police had arrived promptly and adequately in-
vestigated the situation.
These standards, deriving as they do from general principles of
tort law, can be readily implemented in most states by judicial de-
cision. In those states where immunity statutes exist, amend-
ments to those statutes to allow victim recovery is warranted. On
the other hand, it may be that liability predicated upon state ac-
tion, or inaction, already exists under the implementing statutes
of the fourteenth amendment, primarily 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and
1986.133
Case law already exists which establishes that a law enforce-
ment officer who is on the scene of a crime will be liable for dam-
ages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 or 1986 if he acquiesces in the crime
by refusing to protect the victim.' 34 There are also a few cases in
the state courts suggesting that the state will be liable for a
breach of its duty to protect.
For example, in Hansen v. City of St. Paul, 135 the city had re-
ceived complaints that vicious dogs were roaming the neighbor-
hood and biting people. Upon receiving the last of these
132. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 586, 240 N.E.2d 860, 863, 293 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1968) (Keating, J.,
dissenting).
133. See Symkowski v. Miller, 294 F. Supp. 1214 (D. Wis. 1969). Liability may
also be predicated on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 or 1986. See Robeson v. Fanelli, 94 F. Supp.
62 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
134. See C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS, 438-39 (2d ed. 1980). See also
Green v. Williams, 541 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. Tenn. 1981), affid, Green v. Francis, 705
F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1983). In Francis, a sheriff and two deputies were charged with
failure to render assistance and then failure to investigate the incidents; although
the civilian defendants appealed, the sheriff and deputies did not. State action for
the civilian defendants was found because they were "sufficiently connected" with
the official defendants. 705 F.2d at 850. It is difficult to determine whether the lia-
bility of the official defendants was premised upon a failure to act under § 1986 or
as co-conspirators under § 1983.
Compare apparently inconsistent cases under the Federal Torts Claims Act:
Liuzzo v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 640 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (no liability on part of
FBI informant or the government for failure to prevent assault); Bergman v.
United States, 689 F.2d 789 (8th Cir. 1983) (FBI's actions within "discretionary
function" exception under Federal Tort Claims Act).
135. 298 Minn. 205, 214 N.W.2d 346 (1974).
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complaints, the dog wardens began an investigation and were ac-
tually in the field, albeit upon their lunch break, when the plaintiff
was bitten. Nevertheless, the court held that because the city had
notice of the dangerous situation and because it could have taken
reasonable steps to correct it before the incident, the city would
be liable to plaintiff. While the court specifically disclaimed any
application of its decision to the enforcement of the criminal laws,
it would seem that if a citizen has a right to expect protection
against dogs it should follow, afortiori, that he can expect protec-
tion against those who would commit a crime. 136
In other contexts the courts have frequently held that the gov-
ernment has a duty to protect certain individuals. For example,
in Logan v. United States, 137 the Supreme Court held, in deciding
whether mob violence violated a federally protected right, that be-
cause the United States government had a right to detain prison-
ers, it had "an equal duty to protect them, while so held, against
assault or injury from any quarter."138 Further, the decision ex-
pressed the opinion that "[a]ny government" holding a prisoner
"must have the power and the duty" to protect that prisoner.139
Numerous cases exist establishing that the eighth and fourteenth
amendments require the state to provide for the "personal safety"
of prison inmates, not only from actions by non-prisoners, but
also from injury from other inmates.140
136. However, the court in Hansen specifically limited its decision:
This decision specifically relates to tort liability for failure to maintain a
safe sidewalk in the face of an inherently dangerous condition to human
beings created by nonhuman animals, not by other human beings. It
would be a misconstruction of this decision to interpret it as a basis for
restraint upon persons using the public streets or sidewalks under the be-
lief or misbelief that tort liability may be imposed upon the city for al-
lowing other human beings to use or misuse their rights upon the public
streets and sidewalks. For example, in Lamont v. Stavanaugh, 129 Minn.
321, 152 N.W. 720 (1915), the municipality's duty to provide safe streets and
sidewalks did not extend to the moving hazard of a policeman with a
known violent temper who assaulted the plaintiff with a billy club.
Id. at 210-11, 214 N.W.2d at 350.
137. 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
138. Id. at 284. See id. at 285, 294 (providing similar expressions). One theory
for such a requirement is that the prisoners have been deprived of the means of
defending themselves. Id. at 295.
139. Id. at 294.
140. E.g., Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983) (prison guard liable for failure to
protect prisoner from harassment, beatings, and sexual assault by other inmates);
Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370 (11th Cir. 1982) (prisoner assaulted by fellow in-
mate); Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, (M.D. Tenn. 1982). See generally An-
not., 41 A.L.R. 3d 1021 (1972).
Equally noteworthy are the results of a recent decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.'41 In that
case a witness in an organized crime trial, with a lengthy criminal
record, was relocated under the Federal Witness Security Pro-
gram. Less than two months after relocation the witness shot and
killed an auxiliary police officer during the course of a burglary.
The officer's widow sued the government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act alleging the United States Marshal's service was negli-
gent in the supervision of the witness. In the course of deciding
that the government was not liable, the court concluded:
The Witness Security Program establishes that the marshal's service is re-
sponsible for supervising the protection of witnesses. No provision is
made in the Department of Justice policy for steps to be taken to protect
the public from the witness and the inclusion of any such provision might
have been outside the scope of the Witness Security Program statutes.
14 2
In each of these instances, there are distinguishing characteris-
tics differing from that of the normal inhabitant who is free in so-
ciety and becomes a victim of a crime. One might argue that the
aspect of custody deprived the prisoner of a full ability to act in
self-defense, 43 and that the government's action in taking the
suspect into custody creates a "special" relationship giving rise to
an enforceable duty of protection.
Nevertheless, it is somewhat ironic that one suspected or con-
victed of a crime is said to enjoy the right to receive physical pro-
tection from the government while one who is conceded to be a
law-abiding resident is said not to be entitled to such protection.
This contrast is not presented as argument for lesser protections
for those in actual government custody; instead, it is an argument
for increased government protection of law-abiding inhabitants
under its jurisdiction. In the political rhetoric of the day, the pro-
tection due to ordinary people should be elevated at least to the
same level provided to suspected or convicted criminals.
This view does not mean that the government is an insurer of
the safety of all those within its jurisdiction. The government's
only obligation is to act reasonably in order to protect people
within its jurisdiction. In the course of litigation, the trier of fact
would only determine whether, under the circumstances, the con-
duct of governmental employees was "reasonable" and taken in
good faith. This is similar to the "qualified immunity" standard
141. Bergmann v. United States, 689 F.2d 789 (8th Cir. 1982).
142. Id. at 795 (footnote omitted).
143. In the prison context, it would appear that any given prisoner should be in
approximately as good of a relative position to act in self-defense against another
prisoner (though not against a guard) as he would be to act in self-defense against
another person if both were free in society. But he would not have the same free-
dom to avoid any conflict at all by simply running away.
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currently utilized in § 1983 actions against state officials.144 As
such, it should protect law enforcement officials from harassment,
frivolous suits, and even cases in which their judgment may be
fairly questioned. Only in the most egregious of cases would the
victim be able to prevail. This would, however, make a difference
in cases such as Warren v. District of Columbia. 145
VI. ARREST
The power of arrest is largely committed to official police agen-
cies. For misdemeanors, most states provide that a private citizen
can make an arrest only if the alleged offense involved a breach of
the peace or occurs in the citizen's presence. 46 Such require-
ments are generally strictly construed, with any arguable ques-
tion resolved against the validity of the arrest. 47 Citizens are
usually authorized to make arrests for felonies based upon prob-
able cause, but even if the opportunity exists for a private individ-
ual to arrest one suspected of committing a felony, the personal
risk of physical harm provides a significant deterrent. Moreover,
the private citizen assumes the risk of civil liability for false ar-
rest if he is mistaken.148 As a practical matter the number of ac-
cused felons arrested by private citizens is infinitesimal.149 As a
result, almost all arrests are made by members of official police
agencies.
Most states have statutes which specifically require the police
to enforce the criminal statutes by arresting the offending
party 5 0 and "[p] olice manuals are generally quite clear in impos-
144. S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: A GUIDE TO § 1983 at 229-36,
248-53 (1979).
145. 444 A.2d 1 (App. D.C. 1981) (en banc).
146. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 166 (1969).
147. E.g., Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Spears, 231 So. 2d 510 (Miss. 1970).
148. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 132-33 (4th ed. 1971).
149. See Hall, The Role of the Victim in the Prosecution and Disposition of a
Criminal Case, 28 VAND. L. REV. 931, 938 (1975).
150. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 86 (1969) (citing Goldstein, Police Discre-
tion Not to Invoke the Crimimal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Adminis-
tration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 557-58 (1960)). For a more recent summary of
statutes see Allen, The Police and Substantive Rulemaking: Reconciling Principle
and Expediency, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 62, 71-73 (1976).
By way of contrast, in Israel, the police are said to be specifically vested with the
power to refrain from pursuing an investigation for "want of public interest"
where the matter is not a felony. Sebba, supra note 34, at 219 (citing CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE LAW § 53 (1965)).
ing a duty of full enforcement."''9 Indeed, some states have stat-
utes making it a crime for a police officer to fail to make an arrest
for an offense committed in the officer's presence. 52
Yet it is not only well-known but also well-accepted that the po-
lice do not arrest all suspected violators of the criminal laws and
that "full" enforcement does not exist. 53 Indeed, a policeman
"assumes he has discretionary power to arrest or not to arrest a
violator." 154
In making the decision as to whether enforcement should be
made, the officer may be motivated by a variety of factors. Ken-
neth Davis, in his influential Discretionary Justice, catalogued
twenty-one concerns as having a possible bearing upon such a de-
cision. 5 5 Most of these considerations do not involve the wishes
or needs of victims. Though examination of the "shall enforce"
151. K. DAVIS, supra note 146, at 86.
152. W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 78-79
(1965). On the other hand, many states prohibit a warrantless arrest for a misde-
meanor unless it occurred in the officer's presence.
153. Id. at 61-152, 492-93. In spite of the clear language of many of these stat-
utes, it has been argued that the legislature could not have intended full enforce-
ment both because it has acquiesced in partial enforcement and has failed to
appropriate sufficient resources for full enforcement. K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION
79-97 (1975). Whatever the efficacy of these views for legitimizing activity, the lim-
ited resources argument is persuasive at least in this regard: the police cannot be
held to be either civilly or criminally liable for the failure to do the impossible.
154. K. DAviS, supra note 146, at 162. See also W. LAFAVE, supra note 152, at
110-11, 137-43; ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION §§ 4.1 &
3.1-3.3 (Approved Draft, 1973).
155. These factors are:
the police believe the legislative body does not desire enforcement, the
police believe the community wants nonenforcement or lax enforcement,
a policeman believes another immediate duty is more urgent, a policeman
interprets a broad term (e.g., "vagrancy") in his own unique fashion, a po-
liceman is lenient with one who did not intend the violation, the offender
promises not to commit the act again, the statute has long been without
enforcement but is unrepealed, lack of adequate police manpower is be-
lieved to require nonenforcement, the policeman believes a warning or a
lecture preferable to an arrest, the policeman is inclined to be lenient to
those he likes, the policeman sympathizes with the violator, the crime is
common within the subcultural group, the victim does not request the ar-
rest or requests that it not be made, the victim is more likely to get resti-
tution without the arrest, the only witness says he will refuse to testify,
the victim is at fault in inciting the crime, the victim and the offender are
relatives, perhaps husband and wife, making the arrest is undesirable
from the policeman's personal standpoint because of such reasons as the
extra effort required, he goes off duty in ten minutes, the record keeping
necessary when an arrest is made is onerous, or he wants to avoid the ex-
penditure of time for testifying in court, the police trade nonenforcement
for information or for other favors, the police make other kinds of deals
with offenders, the police believe the probable penalty to be too severe,
the arrest would harm a psychiatric condition, or the arrest would unduly
harm the offender's status.
K. DAVIS, supra note 146, at 82-83. See also W. LAFAVE, supra note 152, at 63-152,
and Hall, supra note 149, at 939-44 for a discussion of many of these factors.
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language of the various state statutes might lead one to believe
that mandamus or some other extraordinary remedy could be uti-
lized to force the police to arrest an individual who had violated
the law, the case law upon the subject is to the contrary. 15 6 Nor
can the victim of a crime recover civil damages against a law en-
forcement officer for failure to make an arrest.15 7 Though the
existence of such discretion has occasioned discussion and pro-
posals for reform, the reforms proposed have generally related to
establishing criteria for the exercise of such discretion and not its
abolition. 5 8
There is currently no apparent need for a change of the law in
this area. To the extent that the victim's need for arrest is predi-
cated upon the need for immediate physical protection, a recogni-
tion of the government's duty to protect should vindicate that
right. To the extent that the desire for arrest is motivated by a
desire to initiate prosecution, that interest can be more properly
vindicated by reform of the current view vesting absolute discre-
tion to determine whether prosecution shall go forward or not
with the public prosecutor.
VII. INVESTIGATION
One common grievance of victims is that "complaints are often
not investigated."'159 As is the case with the decision to take an
individual into custody, the decision to investigate is committed
to the discretion of the respective law enforcement agencies. Sig-
nificant differences may nevertheless exist.
A decision not to arrest or not to charge a crime may be based
upon a reasoned good-faith judgment that no crime has been com-
mitted, that the accused is not the person responsible for the
crime, or that the chances of a successful prosecution do not war-
156. E.g., Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1963); Pugach v. Klein, 193
F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Hassan v. Magistrates Court, 20 Misc. 2d 509, 191
N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Restivo v. Dengan, 191 Misc. 642, 77 N.Y.S.2d 563 (Sup.
Ct. 1948).
157. See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R. 3d 700 (1972); Comment, Crime Victims: Re-
coveryfor Police Inaction and Underprotection, 1970 LAW & Soc. ORDER 279, 286-87.
158. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION § 4.1 (Ap-
proved Draft, 1973). Indeed, the ABA Standards, as is true of most commentary
upon the subject, speciflcally caution against an "overreliance" upon the formal
enforcement of the criminal law and suggest that alternative methods should be
considered. See generally id. at §§ 3.1-3.4 and accompanying commentary.
159. Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim In Criminal Prosecution, 52
MIss. L.J. 515, 520 (1982).
rant the expenditures of state funds. Without an investigation,
the law enforcement agency may not be aware of all the relevant
facts and consequently may not be in a situation to make a rea-
soned judgment about arrest or prosecution. Yet an investigation
may simply produce facts which would lead to a reasoned judg-
ment that no arrest was warranted.
Analogies can be drawn to other areas in which government ac-
tors are vested with discretion. For example, in the judicial arena
a trial court is required to eventually decide a case. An extraordi-
nary writ of mandamus or procedendo may be utilized to require
the court to proceed to judgment. While such writs may be used
to require the court to exercise its discretion, they may not be
used to require judgment for one side or the other. In effect, the
extraordinary remedy may tell the court when to exercise its dis-
cretion, but it may not tell the court how to exercise its judgment.
It can be argued that the police should be under a duty to inves-
tigate every reported crime. To the extent that police have the
discretion to make a decision not to proceed with criminal action
against one who has violated a statute, one can argue that such
discretion can only be properly exercised after an investigation
has produced the relevant facts. The police could be required to
investigate, even though they may not be required to prosecute at
the conclusion of that investigation.160
This seems to be the underlying premise of NAACP v. Levi, 161
which held that a complaint based upon the FBI's failure to inves-
tigate an alleged violation of the federal criminal statutes protect-
ing civil rights stated a claim for injunctive and equitable relief.
Similar requirements may exist with respect to prosecutors when
they are on notice that police agencies have not investigated an
alleged crime. 162
Such an approach is similar to the Ethics in Government Act.' 63
This Act requires the Attorney General to conduct a "preliminary
investigation," and to report to the Special Division of the United
States Court of Appeals that "there are no reasonable grounds to
160. State ex rel. Bar Realty Corp. v. Locher, 30 Ohio St. 2d 190, 283 N.E.2d 164
(1972). See also People ex rel. Lindgren v. McGuire, 151 A.D. 413, 136 N.Y.S. 88
(1912).
161. 418 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1976). But see Morgan v. Null, 117 F. Supp. 11, 15-
16 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (mandamus will not lie to require grand jury to investigate a
private person's allegation that his or her civil rights were violated).
162. While recognizing that in most cases the prosecutor will rely upon police
agencies to investigate alleged criminal activities, the ABA Standards neverthe-
less indicate that the prosecutor "has an affirmative responsibility to investigate
suspected illegal activity when it is not adequately dealt with by other agencies."
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
§ 3.1(a) (Approved Draft, 1973).
163. 28 U.S.C. § 592 (1978).
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believe that no further investigation or prosecution is warranted,"
or that further investigation or prosecution is warranted and a
special prosecutor should be appointed.164 The failure of the At-
torney General to do so will constitute grounds for judicial
relief.165
Of course, the nature of the investigation would depend upon
the information supplied. No suggestion is made here that every
possible investigative lead must be followed in order for the gov-
ernment to meet its duty. In many cases it may be that the com-
plaint of the victim is all the investigation required to make a
reasoned determination that nothing else can be done to locate
the perpetrator of the crime. Nor is any suggestion made that the
prosecutor may not rely upon past statistical studies concerning
the probabilities of success in investigating certain types of
crimes given certain limited leads. Further, in an era of scarce re-
sources, the government should be free to exercise a reasoned
judgment as to the priority to be utilized in allocating investiga-
tive resources. 166 The only requirement is that the effort made be
reasonable under the circumstances and supportable by articu-
lated reasons if sought by the victim or required by a reviewing
court.
Like other such remedies effecting discretionary actions, the
implementation of this remedy would not dictate the result of
such an investigation. Rather, it would only require that the in-
vestigation be made so that the exercise of discretion would have
a reasonable basis upon which to be predicated.
VIII. THE DECISION TO PROSECUTE
The decision to prosecute is usually made after exigencies
threatening the victim have passed.167 Many jurisdictions make
164. Id.
165. Nathan v. Attorney Gen., 557 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1983).
166. For example, no reasonable person would question that the allocation of
resources to investigate a mass-murder should take priority over the investigation
of vandalism to a parked car. Similarly, one would surmise that if there were eye-
witnesses to the vandalism of the car, such an investigation might take priority
over investigation of a burglary where there were no witnesses and no clues as to
the identity of the burglar.
167. Since the decision to arrest upon a warrant is generally the result of the
same deliberative process as the decision to charge by complaint, or to seek an
indictment from the grand jury, it will be included within this section as part of
the decision to prosecute.
provision for the use of a complaint, and supporting affidavits, as
the basis for invoking the criminal process under which a sum-
mons or arrest warrant is to be issued.1 68 Most of these provi-
sions set forth no limitations upon who can file the complaint. 169
It is generally thought that any person can initiate such an action
with the court.1 7 0 The courts have nevertheless retained the "dis-
cretion" to decline to order the issuance of the warrant 7 ' and
have done so when they viewed the action as an attempt to cir-
cumvent the discretion of the prosecutor.172
Although many jurisdictions make provisions for the victim to
retain counsel to act as a "private prosecutor," 7 3 such a prosecu-
tor still must act under the supervision and control of the public
prosecutor. 74 The ability of privately retained counsel to prose-
cute an accused is dependent upon the approval of the public
prosecutor. As one authority has concluded: "private prosecution
is at most a theoretical possibility-certainly in current adminis-
tration it is not a practical reality-and thus is not an effective
control over prosecutor charging discretion."175 In fact, a creative
effort to disqualify the public prosecutor so that privately retained
counsel could proceed with a criminal action to which the public
prosecutor objected was forestalled upon the grounds that it was
interfering with the decision-making power allocated to the public
168. E.g., 29 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 4(A) (1982). This rule provides that if prob-
able cause exists an arrest warrant or summons "shall be issued." Compare MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 764.1(a) (1982).
169. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 3 (1982).
170. E.g., Maynard v. Smith, 47 Ohio Misc. 47 (Mun. Ct. 1975); see generally An-
not., 66 A.L.R. 3d 732 (1975).
171. Maynard v. Smith, 47 Ohio Misc. 47 (Mun. Ct. 1975); see also Miller v.
Pennsylvania, 438 A.2d 653, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 131 (1982) (state trial court re-
fused to proceed with criminal process attempted to be initiated by private
citizen).
172. Keenan v. McGrath, 328 F.2d 610 (1st Cir. 1964). In jurisdictions where this
procedure is allowed the ABA Standards suggest that the prosecutor have an op-
portunity to communicate to the court any objections to prosecution. ABA STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.4(c) (1971).
173. See, e.g., State v. Best, 280 N.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 1 (1972); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 19-717 (1981). Although the use of private prosecutors has been uniformly up-
held, the practice has been widely criticized, generally upon due process grounds.
See Note, Private Prosecution-The Entrenched Anomaly, 50 N.C.L. REV. 1171
(1972). For a dated, but more favorable treatment, see also Comment, Private
Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorney's Unwarranted Inaction, 65 YALE L.J.
209 (1955). For a modern call for increased use of private prosecutors see Gold-
stein, supra note 22, at 558-60.
174. People v. Farnsley, 53 Ill. 2d 537, 293 N.E.2d 600 (1973); State v. Best, 280
N.C. 413, 186 S.E.2d 1 (1972); McKay v. State, 90 Neb. 63, 132 N.W. 741 (1911); State
v. Kent, 4 N.D. 577, 62 N.W. 631 (1895). See also Powers v. Hauck, 399 F.2d 322, 325
(5th Cir. 1968).
175. F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A
CRIME 329 (1969).
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prosecutor.176
Like the decisions to arrest and investigate, the decision to initi-
ate prosecution is currently vested almost exclusively in a desig-
nated public official. The leeway for decision-making by the
public prosecutor is generally described in terms of a discretion
which is said to be "exceedingly broad."1 77 Though these terms
would, by implication, suggest that there is at least some limita-
tion on the discretion of the prosecutor, case law has been to the
contrary. A reading of the relevant cases suggests that the deci-
sion to prosecute is vested in the "absolute discretion" of the pub-
lic prosecutor. 7 8
For example, the courts have uniformly denied extraordinary
relief in situations where a private party sought to use judicial
process to compel the investigating agency to issue a warrant to
initiate criminal process.' 79 This is true no matter "how clear the
case may seem to the court."180 Attempts by private parties to
use the extraordinary remedy of mandamus to compel the prose-
cutor to proceed with prosecution have also been uniformly de-
nied.1 81 Mandamus has sometimes been denied on the theory
176. People v. Municipal Court, 27 Cal. App. 3d 193, 103 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1972). In
part this decision was founded upon a concern with separation of powers con-
cepts. See also Annot., 66 A.L.R. 3d 732 (1975).
177. United States v. Bell, 506 F.2d 207, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See also F. MILLER,
supra note 175, at 173-78, 283-84; K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 188-214 (1969).
178. In 1931, the Wickersham Commission (National Commission on Law Ob-
servance and Enforcement) concluded: "[T]he Prosecutor [is] the real arbiter of
what laws shall be enforced and against whom." NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LAW OB-
SERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 19 (1931).
The ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNC-
TION, Introduction 19 (Approved Draft, 1971) concluded that: "[Tihe prosecutor is
vested with virtually unreviewable power as to the persons to be prosecuted or
not." See Ferguson, Formulation of Enforcement Policy: An Anatomy of the Prose-
cutor's Discretion Prior to Accusation, 11 RUTGERS L. REV. 507, 518 (1957). Smith v.
United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967): "The
discretion of the Attorney General in choosing whether to prosecute ... is
absolute."
179. Restivo v. Dengan, 191 Misc. 642, 77 N.Y.S.2d 563 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
180. Id. at 646, 77 N.Y.S.2d at 568. See also United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S.
407, 412-13 (1920); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1868). Compare Ex
parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932), where the Court required the lower court
to issue a bench warrant sought by the Attorney General after an indictment had
been returned by the grand jury. In that case, where the issuance of the warrant
was necessary in order to implement a properly made decision to prosecute, as op-
posed to being part of the discretionary decision to prosecute, the Supreme Court
held the lower court's duty was ministerial rather than discretionary.
181. Annot., 5 A.L.R. FED. 922 (1970). See also Ross v. United States Att'ys Of-
fice, 511 F.2d 524 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 831 (1975); United States v. Cox,
that the state is the only interested party in a criminal prosecu-
tion and that, consequently, the moving party lacks standing. 82
While injunctive relief has occasionally been obtained against
police agencies to require enforcement of the law in certain
classes of cases such as domestic abuse,1 8 3 no cases appear in
which such relief has been used to require the public prosecutor
to initiate specific criminal prosecutions. Further, civil damages
do not appear to be available even where, after a failure to prose-
cute husbands for spousal abuse, the wives were eventually
killed,184 or where it is alleged that the failure to prosecute was
due to prejudice against people of a certain national origin.I8 5
Consequently, the existing case law seems to firmly indicate
that the decision to initiate prosecution is committed totally to
the discretion of the prosecutor. Though unbridled discretion has
342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); State ex rel. Naramore v.
Hensley, 53 N.M. 308, 207 P.2d 529 (1949).
182. E.g., State ex rel. Skilton v. Miller, 164 Ohio St. 163, 128 N.E.2d 47 (1955).
But see Miles-Lee Auto Supply Co. v. Bellows, 26 Ohio Op. 2d 452, 197 N.E.2d 247
(1964) (relator hurt by competitor's failure to comply with Sunday closing laws).
While unsuccessful on other grounds, standing was found in Inmates of Attica
Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 378 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). "The Court's prior decisions consistently
hold that a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting author-
ity when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution....
[I1n American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable
interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another." Id. at 619.
183. See, e.g., Sorichett v. City of New York, 95 Misc. 2d 451, 408 N.Y.S.2d 219,
affd. 70 A.D.2d 573, 417 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1978); Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396
N.Y.S.2d 974 (injunctive relief to require law enforcement agencies to protect bat-
tered wives), rev'd, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1977) (on mootness grounds
because of intervening consent decree); Note, Municipal Law-Negligence-Fail-
ure of Police to Provide Protection to the Holder of a Family Court Order of Protec-
tion States Valid Cause of Action, 7 FORDHAM L. REV. 191 (1978). See also
Coalition of Black Leadership v. Cianci, 480 F. Supp. 1340 (D.R.I. 1979) (referring to
prior consent decree establishing procedures for filing, investigation at resolution
of civilian complaints against police officers).
184. The Texas Court of Appeals for the Second District, in Miller v. Curry, de-
cided on November 25, 1981, held:
Prosecutors who refused to prosecute cases of physical abuse against
"battered wives" are absolutely immune from liability in 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action filed by surviving children of two women who were shot to death by
their husbands after unsuccessfully seeking protection "in some unspeci-
fied form" from their husbands' violent and threatening behavior.
51 U.S.L.W. 3227 (1982); 625 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. App. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 60
(1982).
185. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in Dohaish v.
Tooley, decided on February 16, 1982, held:
Father of homicide victim lacks standing to bring 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
against district attorney who allegedly refused to prosecute son's accused
murderer because of district attorney's prejudice against Saudi Arabians;
moreover, district attorney is absolutely immune from suit for conduct re-
lated to discharge of his official duties, including decision not to prosecute.
51 U.S.L.W. 3227 (1982); 670 F.2d 934, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 60 (1982).
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often been condemned in uncompromising terms, 8 6 no one has
proposed that the discretion of the prosecutor be abolished.
There have, however, been proposals that guidelines be adopted
to standardize the decision-making process and to minimize the
range of such discretion. 87
However, these proposals would nevertheless leave the victim,
or his family, without any judicial remedy in cases where the
prosecutor elected not to prosecute. This has occurred in other
situations. For example, in both Schlesinger v. Reservists Commit-
tee to Stop the War 188 and United States v. Richardson, 189 the
Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to enforce certain
provisions of the Constitution. In Schlesinger the plaintiffs sought
to enforce the incompatability clause' 90 in such a way as to pro-
hibit individuals from simultaneously holding office as members
of Congress and as military officers in the United States Reserves.
The Court dismissed as irrelevant the argument that if they did
not have standing then, as a practical matter, no one would have
standing.' 9 ' In Richardson, the plaintiffs sought to compel disclo-
186. "Law has reached its finest moments when it has freed man from the un-
limited discretion of some ruler, some civil or military official, some bureaucrat.
Where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered .... Absolute discretion
... is more destructive of freedom than any of man's other inventions." United
States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 101 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also
Justice White's opinion concerning the exercise of police power to stop citizens for
questioning: "This kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil
the Court has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion
of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent." Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
187. E.g., ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION § 4.2 (Ap-
proved Draft, 1973); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION AND
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 3.4(b) -.9(b)(c) (Approved Draft, 1971); K. DAVIS, DIS-
CRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); Bubany and Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Adminis-
trative Law for Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 Am. CRnI. L. REV. 473 (1976).
Some jurisdictions have adopted rules to set forth guidelines in using
prosecutorial discretion. Williams, Police Discretion: The Institutional Dilemma-
Who Is in Charge?, 68 IOWA L. REV. 431, 458-59 n.159 (1983) (citing California Dis-
trict Attorneys Ass'n, Uniform Crime Charging Standards 27-40 (1974)).
188. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
189. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
190. Art. I, § 6, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution provides:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was
elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United
States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall
have been encreased [sic] during such time; and no Person holding any
Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during
his Continuance in Office.
Id.
191. 418 U.S. at 227.
sure of the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency under the
requirement of article I, section 9 of the Constitution.192 The
Court found that the lack of standing by anyone to judicially chal-
lenge the practices in question might indicate that no judicial
remedy was intended.193
The Court suggested in those cases that the lack of a judicial
remedy did not preclude any relief because the plaintiffs would
always have a political remedy. It might be argued that the same
is true with respect to the prosecutor's decisions not to prosecute.
An "abuse" of discretion might well become a political issue
which could affect the ability of a given prosecutor to continue to
hold office, whether in a jurisdiction where the prosecutor is
elected or appointed.
In certain jurisdictions there are "removal" statutes under
which the prosecutor can be removed by judicial process where
he has failed to enforce the laws.' 94 Similarly, a showing that the
failure to prosecute was based upon racial, ethnic, or religious
prejudice, or corruption might be sufficient to invoke impeach-
ment and removal. Although there are instances where this pro-
cess has been successfully invoked when a prosecutor failed to
enforce the criminal laws, 195 there appear to be no modern cases
in which this was used as a ground for removal.
The effectiveness of these political remedies is open to ques-
tion. It has been noted that public opinion is unlikely to have any
great effect because the policies and day-to-day decisions of the
prosecutor are likely to be unknown to the public.196 Because the
public is likely to be informed about only a few sensational trials
reported by the media, public opinion "may do little more than
encourage the prosecutor to avoid bad publicity by maintaining a
low profile and a high conviction record and by refusing to prose-
cute influential citizens or enforce unpopular laws." 197
192. That provision, in paragraph 7, reads in relevant part: "[A] regular State-
ment and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be
published from time to time."
193. 418 U.S. at 227.
194. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 309.05. (Baldwin 1978); N.Y. CONST., art. XIII, § 13
(McKinney 1952) (removal of district attorney); CAL GOV'T CODE § 3072 (West
1980) (removal of district attorney).
195. State ex rel. Johnston v. Foster, 32 Kan. 14, 3 P. 534 (1884) (failure to prose-
cute various individuals for violation of state liquor laws); State ex rel. McKittrick
v. Graves, 346 Mo. 990, 144 S.W.2d 91 (1940) (failure to prosecute liquor, vice, gam-
bling, and election law violations). But see State ex rel. Gebrink v. Hospers, 147
Iowa 712, 714, 126 N.W. 818, 819 (1910) (must be a "clear showing of corruption ...
negligence or incompetence...").
196. Bubany & Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative Law for
Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 473, 488 (1976).
197. Id. (footnote omitted).
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It is also particularly important to give special consideration to
the "poor and powerless" as victims "because their burden of law-
lessness and violence is so disproportionately heavy ... "198 A
moment's reflection will suggest that these victims are the very
ones who are most likely to be dissatisfied with the prosecutor's
decisions. Other victims are more likely to gain the sympathy of
the prosecutor's office; to establish a better rapport because of the
likelihood they are of the same social "class" as the prosecutor; to
have their own attorney to negotiate with the prosecutor on their
behalf; and, consequently, to have the ability to obtain more re-
sponsive action from the prosecutor's office.
Equally as important, these same individuals are also in the
best position to bring pressure upon the prosecutor's office if they
are dissatisfied. This is true whether such pressure takes the
form of publicity, political lobbying, or litigation. In contrast, the
poor are not only less likely to receive satisfaction from the prose-
cutor's office, but are also much more likely to lack both the so-
phistication and the power to take action against the prosecutor's
office-particularly political action in the form of publicity, con-
testing elections, filing removal actions, or threatening
impeachment.
For the majority of victims, then, such political remedies may
be entirely illusory. However, victims might have the ability to
obtain a lawyer to attempt to vindicate their position against the
prosecutor in court if there were any viable remedies available. 199
The prosecutor's "absolute" discretion and "monopoly" over the
initiation of a criminal prosecution are not inevitable features of a
fair judicial system. The criminal laws of other nations allow the
victim to play a much larger role in the determination of whether
criminal prosecution shall ensue. In Israel, certain minor offenses
may be privately prosecuted unless the public prosecutor inter-
venes and takes over the prosecution. 200 The decision of the po-
198. F. CARRINGTON, THE VIcTIMs 33 (1975). See also id. at 33-35.
199. A number of organizations providing free legal services might be willing to
represent indigent victims if there were prospects of success in the courtroom.
However, given the present status of the law, the prospects of success are so bleak
that it is unreasonable to expect individuals to seek to initiate such suits in any
large numbers or to expect many attorneys to agree to participate in such cases.
200. Sebba, The Victim's Role in the Penal Process: A Theoretical Orientation,
30 AM. J. CoMP. L. 217, 222, 232 (1982) (citing CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW § 58
(1965)); Harnon, Criminal Procedure in Israel-Some Comparative Aspects, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 1091, 1097 (1967).
lice or public prosecutor not to prosecute major offenses can be
appealed to the attorney general and subsequently to the High
Court.20 1 In France, the filing of a civil action against the accused
will oblige the public prosecutor to proceed with a criminal action
even though he would elect not to prosecute if he otherwise
could.2°2 Scotland provides for private prosecution upon authori-
zation by the court after the public prosecutor has refused to
prosecute the case.203 Germany not only authorizes private pros-
ecution in a limited number of cases but also provides that the
prosecutor can be compelled to file charges by judicial action ini-
tiated by a victim. 204
In discussing the possibilities of judicial review of a decision
not to prosecute, Leslie Sebba raises an important point:
Most legal systems provide for a mechanism, whether by means of a pre-
liminary hearing or a grand jury, to prevent an arbitrary instigation of
prosecution that would subject an innocent suspect to unnecessary suffer-
ing. Is the victim also entitled to a controlling mechanism to prevent an
arbitrary non-prosecution of his complaint? 20 5
Kenneth Davis, in his widely acclaimed Discretionary Justice, 206
pointed out that while the power to prosecute is "enormous", "the
negative power to withhold prosecution may be even greater, be-
cause it is less protected against abuse."207 Currently, concepts of
judicial review only apply to those instances in which prosecution
is actually initiated.208 In cases where prosecution is declined,
most jurisdictions provide no remedy.209
Davis contrasts this with the administrative law areas and con-
cludes: "The reasons for a judicial check of prosecutors' discre-
tion are stronger than for such a check of other administrative
201. Sebba, supra note 34, at 221 (citing CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW § 58 (1965));
Harnon, supra note 200, at 1097.
202. Larguier, The Civil Action for Damages in French Criminal Procedure, 39
TUL. L. REV. 687 (1965).
203. Comment, Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys' Unwar-
ranted Inaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209, 224 n.77, (citing Normand, The Public Prosecutor
in Scotland, 54 L.Q. REV. 345, 347-48 (1938)).
204. Jescheck, Principles of German Criminal Procedure in Comparison with
American Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 239, 245 (1970). See also Jescheck, The Discretion-
ary Powers of the Prosecuting Attorney in West Germany, 18 AM. J. CoMp. L. 508
(1970); Schram, The Obligation to Prosecute in West Germany, 17 AM. J. CoMP. L.
627 (1969).
205. Sebba, supra note 34, at 221.
206. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
207. K. DAvis, supra note 150, at 188.
208. E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (use of criminal law for dis-
criminatory enforcement of laundry licensing law). See generally Applegate,
Prosecutorial Discretion and Discrimination in the Decision to Charge, 55 TEMP.
L.Q. 35 (1982). While understandable, it is somewhat ironic that for the vice of
general non-enforcement of the law, the remedy is more non-enforcement.
209. But see MICH. STAT. § 28,981 (Callaghan 1982) (authorizing the court to re-
quire prosecution).
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discretion that is now traditionally reviewable." 210 Though unbri-
dled discretion is often thought to be a necessary component of
our system, Davis effectively refutes that concept by references to
other countries, such as Germany, and also to the Michigan prac-
tice of allowing judicial review of a prosecutor's decision not to
prosecute.2 1' In rejecting traditional arguments used to preclude
review of prosecutorial decisions, Davis concludes:
Instead of saying that "few subjects are less adapted to judicial review"
than prosecutors' discretion, I would say that few subjects are more
adapted to judicial review than a protection against abuse. Instead of say-
ing that "it is not the function of the judiciary to review the exercise of
executive discretion," I could cite a hundred Supreme Court decisions
stating that it is the function of the judiciary to review the exercise of ex-
ecutive discretion ... 212
It is one thing to accept the fact that some guilty parties will es-
cape punishment because they escape detection or apprehension;
it is quite another to accept the fact that parties will escape pun-
ishment as a result of the deliberate choice of a government offi-
cial.213 In large part this result may come from the assumption
that unbridled prosecutorial discretion is inevitable. This is an
assumption that, as Davis indicates, does not represent "the best
thinking of which our society is capable." 2 14 While such unthink-
ing assumptions might be acceptable in a society struggling with
survival, "[i] n an affluent country,. . . the legal system's answers
to such questions ... should be based upon the most careful de-
liberation, not on considerations of convenience and economy
which gain support from habits and assumptions." 2 15
The assumptions used as primary justifications for unbridled
prosecutorial discretion are: (1) claims that the decisions to be
made by the prosecutor are unsuited for judicial review, and (2)
judicial review would, itself, infringe upon the prerogatives of the
executive and hence violate the separation of powers doctrine.
Neither of these concerns is legitimate.
210. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 211-12 (1969) (emphasis omitted).
211. Id. at 191-95, 212.
212. Id. at 209-10 (footnote omitted). One of those who has taken the contrary
position is Chief Justice Burger. As a judge on the District of Columbia Circuit he
wrote: "Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the
Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal pro-
ceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or whether to dismiss a proceed-
ing once brought." Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
213. K. DAVIS, supra note 210, at 230.
214. Id.
215. Id.
A starting point is to consider what approach is taken with the
prosecutorial decision to dismiss charges in criminal proceedings.
At common law the power to enter a nolle prosequi was vested
exclusively in the prosecutor without any judicial restraint.2 16
Yet, by statute or court rule, it is now almost uniformly estab-
lished that once prosecution is initiated, dismissal can be ob-
tained only with the consent of the court.2 17 This fact bears upon
both justifications for the lack of review of prosecutorial
decisions.
The entering of a nolle, like the decision not to charge at all, re-
sults in the lack of criminal process against an alleged criminal.
The same factors that may justify a decision not to charge may be
utilized later to nolle the charges. Hence, both the "standards" of
review and the infringement upon executive power are relatively
the same. If review of a prosecution decision to enter a nolle
prosequi can exist in contemporary society without any illegiti-
mate infringement upon executive power and with the application
of judicially manageable standards, then review of the decision
not to charge can also exist without raising either of these
problems.
Second, with respect to the separation of powers, Davis appears
to be correct in his assessment that the argument "is so clearly
unsound as to be almost absurd."2 8
If separation of powers prevents review of discretion of executive officers,
then more than a hundred Supreme Court decisions spread over a cen-
tury and three-quarters will have to be found contrary to the Constitution!
... [Otherwise] the courts would be powerless to interfere when execu-
tive officers, acting illegally, are about to execute an innocent person!
2 1 9
Third, making decisions about initiating and dismissing cases
are relatively similar and hence are already proven to be judi-
cially manageable. Moreover, such considerations are altogether
similar to those which judges utilize when determining an appro-
priate sentence for an offender.
Nor should such considerations be rebuffed because of a feeling
that it invades a traditional province of the prosecutor. As set
forth above, the "invasion" of the nolle prosequi power has had no
adverse effect. Further, actions of the Reconstruction Congress
indicate that legislators have not always been so deferential of
prosecutorial discretion. Most instructive is the Civil Rights Act
of 1875.220 Section three of that Act provided in part:
216. People v. Municipal Court, 27 Cal. App. 3d 193, 200, 103 Cal. Rptr. 645, 650
(1972).
217. Id. at 201, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 653-54.
218. K. DAvis, supra note 210, at 210.
219. Id.
220. 18 Stat. 335 (1875). This act was declared unconstitutional on the grounds
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any district attorney who shall willfully fail to institute and prosecute the
proceedings herein required, shall, for every such offense, forfeit and pay
the sum of five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved thereby, to be re-
covered by an action of debt, with full costs ... 221
The same provisions of the statute made failure to enforce the
statute a misdemeanor punishable by a fine between $500 and
$1,000. It provided that either a recovery by the victim-turned-
civil-plaintiff or a conviction by the government would bar the al-
ternative action. The obvious effect was to provide the victim
with a civil remedy against a federal prosecutor who failed to vin-
dicate his rights by properly invoking criminal process against the
alleged criminal. If such an action was constitutional, and there is
no reason to suspect that it was not, then a judicial review of a
decision not to charge would seem even less intrusive and there-
fore more acceptable.
The government's duty of protection and the victim's standing
to contest governmental action relating to his injury should be
sufficient to allow judicial review of the prosecutor's decisions
under an abuse of discretion standard. Again, the decisions of the
prosecution based upon a reasoned good-faith consideration of
the victim's interest should result in judgment for the state. But a
showing that the victim's interest was not given consideration, or
that the state's interest in non-prosecution could not reasonably
outweigh the victim's interest in prosecution, should result in a
requirement that the state proceed with the prosecution.
IX. RELEASE OF PERSONS IN STATE CUSTODY
Just as the duty to protect citizens includes not only immediate
physical protection, but also the right to have violations of their
personal security vindicated by prosecution, it also includes the
right to have that safety protected by the punishment of individu-
als who have committed criminal offenses. The decision as to
whether the security of citizens requires the imprisonment of a
given individual is subject to the sentencing requirements set by
the legislature. However, individuals in the custody of the state,
that it affected private parties, rather than the state, and hence was not within the
enforcement power of the fourteenth amendment. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883). Compare Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)
(upholding similar provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1965 under the commerce
power). The section relied on here was not the subject of the constitutional
challenge.
221. 18 Stat. 335, 336, § 3 (1875).
either in prison or in mental institutions, often receive early re-
leases by way of parole or through a decision that their mental
condition no longer warrants confinement in a mental institution.
There are documented instances of cases in which such individu-
als have committed crimes shortly after their release.
For example, in Martinez v. California, 222 an individual with a
history of sex offenses was released on parole and subsequently
killed a fifteen year old girl. Similarly, in Holmes v. Wampler, 2 23 a
patient who was released from a state mental hospital stabbed an
individual five weeks after he was released from the institution.
There is respectable support for the proposition that these inci-
dents occur because "those who make the decision as to release
far too often err on the side of leniency in the hope that the crimi-
nal at liberty will not victimize again."224 It is difficult to assess
the accuracy of this view, however, because there is no empirical
data on the subject. It is entirely possible that parole boards ac-
tually err on the side of non-release, and the instances which are
documented are either aberrations or mistakes made notwith-
standing the bias against release.225
There is debate among the federal circuit courts as to whether
parole boards enjoy absolute or qualified immunity against a civil
rights suit filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.226 A recent Ninth Circuit
case, while finding absolute immunity from suits filed by potential
parolees, specifically reserved the question as to the immunity, if
any, that the board would enjoy from § 1983 suits initiated by per-
sons injured by a dangerous parolee.2 27 However, the Supreme
Court for the State of Arizona has held that the parole board may
be liable for a grossly negligent or reckless release of highly dan-
gerous prisoners. 228 One commentator who analyzed the cases in
this area came to the conclusion that the government should be
liable for reckless conduct but that government actions should be
222. 444 U.S. 277 (1980). For an example of other instances of parolees commit-
ting serious crimes and some indication of resulting litigation in which victims re-
covered, see F. CARRINGTON, THE VICTIMS at 176-77, 181 (1975).
223. 546 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Va. 1982).
224. F. CARRINGTON, supra note 198, at 176.
225. Justice Blackmun recently emphasized that there is information sug-
gesting that professionals may tend to "overpredict" tendencies for future violence
either out of fear of being responsible for an early release or from improper gener-
alizations based upon contacts with past offenses. Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct.
3383, 3409 n.4 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
226. See S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO
§ 1983, § 8.15, at 262-63 (1979).
227. Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102
(1981).
228. Grimn v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227
(1977).
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protected by a qualified immunity.229
The application of such a standard would appear to be a
salutory one. An example of how it would work might be illus-
trated by contrasting the parolee releases documented in Frank
Carrington's The Victims. 230 One example indicates that an indi-
vidual who had been sentenced to four years for grand theft was
paroled after seven months. Subsequently, he shot and killed an-
other man who was trying to protect the parolee's sister from be-
ing beaten by the parolee. Based upon these facts, it appears that
the parolee had no prior crime of violence and that there was no
reason for the parole board to believe he would commit a violent
offense. Under these circumstances, assuming the board had con-
ducted a proper investigation and exercised a good faith belief
that he could return to society without jeopardizing anyone's
safety, liability should not attach.
In contrast, consider the case of Arthur St. Peter who, with a
record of forty felonies, seventeen escapes and escape attempts,
and a life sentence, was allowed to participate in a program
outside the penitentiary, called "Take-A-Lifer-To-Dinner." 23 1 Mr.
St. Peter participated in that program and made a successful es-
cape. Later, during an armed robbery, he killed a shop owner and
wounded the shop owner's wife. At trial, a jury returned a verdict
of $186,000 against the warden in favor of the victim-plaintiff. The
results should be the same under the above proposed test.
The warden could be faulted on two separate grounds. One,
there was no statutory authorization to initiate such a program or
to allow people sentenced to a life term to leave prison. Second,
even had such authorization existed, allowing a man with such a
record to participate in the program would seem to amount to
gross negligence.
Another example that might produce liability would be where a
prisoner not granted parole is mistakenly released. Liability
could also attach if there was a failure to properly investigate the
prisoner's background; where due to negligence in compiling
records the parole board did not have accurate knowledge about
the prisoner's actual sentence or prior record or some other im-
portant matter. This would create liability in instances in which it
229. Comment, Victims Suit Against Government Entities and Officials for
Reckless Release, 29 Am. U.L. REV. 595, 631 (1980).
230. See supra note 198, at 177.
231. Id. at 181.
could be documented that the parole board was actually mistaken
and that such mistakes were due to their negligence.
On the other hand, a "but for" test would not be adequate
under a qualified immunity standard, e.g., but for the release the
crime would not have been committed. In matters of judgment,
the parole board's demonstration of good faith action should be
enough to insulate it from liability. This should give incentive for
accuracy in the work of the parole board and prison officials with-
out threatening the good faith use of their own judgment. It
should provide a remedy in those situations in which the parole
board's negligence resulted in injury to a victim. At the same
time, it would not infringe on the board's discretion to release
those who, in its judgment, can make a successful transition back
to society.
X. CIVIL LIABILITY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
If, as set forth above, the state does have a duty to protect its
citizens from physical harm and harm to their property, what
remedy does, or should, exist when that duty is breached? One
possibility is that the citizen should always have the right to re-
cover damages from the government itself.
One possible objection to this approach of the government's
duty to protect would be that the government or its officials would
be liable every time a crime was committed.232 Though this might
not be good policy, there is probably no constitutional impedi-
ment against this result. To the contrary, there is respectable pre-
cedent for the proposition that the government can be made the
"insurer" of the security of those within its jurisdiction and that
government officials can be held strictly liable for the perform-
ance of their duties.
For example, at common law, the American sheriff was often re-
quired to post a bond to secure the faithful performance of his233
office. The sheriff was held to be absolutely liable for the continu-
ous custody of his prisoners. While the law recognized certain
limited exceptions to this strict liability,234 the general theory
232. This very view was argued in Congress in the debates on the Ku Klux
Klan Act. James R. McCormick, a Democrat from Missouri, argued that "no State
ever did and no State ever can give equal protection of its laws. Every person who
suffers an outrage in person or property the law has failed to protect him; and if
the violators of law escaped from the limits of the State, its authorities may even
fail to punish the authors of the crime." CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 139
(1871).
233. At this time all sheriffs were male.
234. For example, where the County Commissioners refused the sheriff's re-
quest to appropriate enough money to build a secure jail, the sheriff was held not
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was that if a prisoner escaped, circumstances existed which justi-
fied the forfeiture of the sheriff's bond without any showing of
fault.2 3
5
A second example, also of ancient lineage 236 and established by
statute in several states in the 19th century,23 7 makes a local gov-
ernment organization absolutely liable to individuals injured as a
result of riotous conduct within the boundaries of the governmen-
tal unit. Such a provision, generally referred to as the Sherman
Amendment, 238 was proposed and passed by the United States
Senate 239 as part of its effort to provide for enforcement of the
fourteenth amendment. A modified version of this proposal was
suggested by the House and Senate Conference Committee. 240 In
the debates upon the propriety of enacting such a bill it was re-
ferred to as a form of "insurance" under which the inhabitants of
to be strictly liable for the escape of prisoners. Rather, it appears that a negli-
gence standard was utilized.
235. See also Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597 (1982) (civil liability for
negligent supervision of four-time escapee from the Arizona Youth Center which
led to serious and permanent injuries to victim of subsequent robbery).
236. It is said that such a statute was adopted in England immediately after the
Norman conquest. MoneU v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 667 n.17
(1978).
237. It is said that such liability was common in the New England States and
that similar statutes existed in Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New
York. Monell, 436 U.S. at 668 n.17. However, the Sherman bill was criticized as be-
ing a deviation from these statutes because it appeared, unlike those statutes, to
impose liability even without negligence. Id. at 657 & n.18. Although Senator
Sherman maintained that liability would not attach without fault, other propo-
nents of the bill claimed that it would and this is apparently the reading of the
proposal by the Court. Id. at 692-93 n.57.
238. The sponsor of the amendment was Senator John Sherman of Ohio, the
brother of General William T. Sherman. He represented Ohio in the House of
Representatives for six years (1855-1861) and in the United States Senate for 32
years (1861-1877 and 1881-1897). He served as Secretary of the Treasury (1877-
1881) under President Hayes and Secretary of State (1897-1898) under President
McKinley. BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, 1774-1971
(1971). The legislative history of this proposal is traced in Monell, 436 U.S. at 666-
89.
239. The provision as passed by the Senate is reproduced in Monell, 436 U.S. at
702-03. This proposal made the "inhabitants of the county, city, or parish in which
any of the said offenses shall be committed" liable "to pay full compensation" to
the injured parties or their survivors. Id. (emphasis added).
240. The provision is set forth in Monell, 436 U.S. at 703-04. This substitute pro-
posal made the governmental entity itself liable: "in every such case the county,
city or parish in which any of the said offenses shall be committed shall be liable
to pay full compensation .. " The act made specific provision for the execution
of judgment against the government. But it also provided that the government
could then recover against the party directly causing the injury. Id.
any given community would mutually guarantee the security of
each other's property.24 1 While it is true that some raised argu-
ments about the constitutionality of creating such liability,242 and
the proposal was eventually rejected by the House of Representa-
tives, the prevailing view seems to be that the rejection was pre-
mised upon considerations of policy and not constitutional law.243
Indeed, according to Justice Douglas, the constitutionality of the
proposal was "vigorously debated with powerful arguments ad-
vanced in the affirmative. " 24 4
Moreover, statutes imposing liability upon municipalities for
mob violence exist in several states. 245 Despite the fact that the
statutes vary somewhat in the terms under which liability has
been imposed, they have uniformly withstood constitutional chal-
lenge.246 Their operation appears to result in the municipality be-
coming an "insurer" against misconduct under its jurisdiction,
because a requirement that the municipality receive prior notice
of the potential disorder is said to be inoperative if it was impossi-
ble to give such notice,247 and because the impossibility of
preventing the injury is not a defense. 248
Third, contrary to the apparent assumptions of certain courts, it
is not unusual for government employees to be held liable for
241. According to Representative Butler, whose home state had such a statute,
the purpose was not punitive, but rather "[ilt is a mutual insurance." CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 792 (1871) (emphasis added).
242. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 709, reh'g denied, 412 U.S. 963
(1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 190 (1961). As the Supreme Court noted in
Monell, 436 U.S. at 676, the constitutional argument against the Sherman amend-
ment "was clearly supported by precedent-albeit precedent that has not sur-
vived." Thus, those arguments, even if otherwise pertinent, would have no
application now.
243. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190. See also Brief for Petitioners at 62-65, Monell, 436
U.S. 963 (reproduced in 105 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 125-28 (P. Kurland & G. Cas-
per eds. 1979)), suggesting that in many instances the law enforcement power was
vested in the state, not the local government, and that it would be unfair to make
the local government liable for that over which it had no corrective power. How-
ever, from the excerpts of the Congressional Globe relied upon it is difficult to de-
termine whether the defect was the lack of municipal power or the lack of
municipal duty. It could be argued that in the view of some, the fourteenth
amendment applied only to the state and not the municipal government. See also
Monell, 436 U.S. at 670-71 n.21, 673.
244. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190 (1961) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Though it was not speaking of vicarious liability, the Court has found no tenth or
eleventh amendment impediment to municipal liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690
n.54.
245. For a summary of the statutes see Note, Municipal Liability for Riot Dam-
age, 81 HARv. L. REV. 653 (1968).
246. Annot., 26 A.L.R. 3d 1142, 1149 (1969). See also, Annot., 26 A.L.R. 3d 1198
(1969).
247. Id. at 1150.
248. Id.
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negligence in failing to protect citizens. 24 9 Indeed, as part of its
enforcement power under section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment, Congress has specifically declared that any state officer
having knowledge of certain conspiracies to deprive citizens of
their constitutional rights, and who have the power to stop such
injury but fail to do so, will be liable for damages. 250 If one ac-
cepts the view that the fourteenth amendment imposes a general
duty of protection upon the state governments, then it necessarily
follows that a civil cause of action could be implied under the
amendment 25 1 or enacted by Congress.
Fourth, it appears that many of the victim compensation stat-
utes are premised, at least in part, upon the belief that there is
"an obligation to compensate those citizens whom the govern-
ment has promised but failed to protect."252 Thus, there should
249. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.44 (Baldwin 1983) (making administrators, em-
ployees, or faculty members of state universities liable for "hazing," when they
knew or reasonably should have known about it and failed to make a "reasonable
attempt to prevent it"). Id.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1976).
251. E.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Though Bivens
was a civil suit based on the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court has allowed
"direct action" suits to be brought under the fifth amendment, Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228 (1979), and the eighth amendment, Carlson v. Greene, 446 U.S. 14
(1980). The rationale of these cases would seem to allow such suits upon all
amendments. Prior to Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
(which rendered the issue moot), certain federal courts had recognized direct ac-
tions suits based on the fourteenth amendment against cities in order to avoid the
holding of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (a city was not a person and there-
fore could not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
252. Considerations, supra note 4, at 2. Carrington, Victims' Rights Litigation:
A Wave of the Future?, 11 U. RICH. L. REV. 447, 452 (1977). "[Victim compensation]
legislation is premised upon the duty of the state to protect its citizens. The ra-
tionale is that if a citizen is victimized, the state has by definition failed in its duty,
and thus should compensate the injured party." Id. Comment, Alabama's Anti-
Profit Statute: A Recent Trend in Victim Compensation, 33 ALA. L. REV. 109 (1981):
"The belief that society is partly to blame for the losses suffered by victims of
crime has motivated many states to enact measures designed to make reparations
for at least a portion of the victim's loss." Id. (footnote omitted).
See also Clark & Webster, Indiana's Victim Compensation Act: A Comparative
Perspective, 14 IND. L. REV. 751, 753 n.23 (1981) (citing Goldberg, Equality and Gov-
ernmental Action, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 205, 224 (1964)) and Note, Compensation for
the Criminally Injured Revisited: An Emphasis on the Victim, 47 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 88,93 (1971)).
It would appear, however, that these authors are referring to a "moral" rather
than a legal obligation. If compensation statutes were based upon a legal obliga-
tion then they should not be limited to compensation for personal injuries and
should include injuries to property. Yet it appears that no American jurisdiction
authorizes such recovery. Clark & Webster, supra at 753. However, restitution is
often used in such situations. Similarly, in order to make the victim whole there
be no general constitutional objection to imposing civil liability
upon the government, or its employees, for a breach of their con-
stitutional duty of protection. However, some may wonder
whether the concept of sovereign immunity, as protected by the
eleventh amendment, may not stand as a barrier to these propos-
als. The eleventh amendment was early interpreted to protect the
sovereign immunity of the states. Many of the proposals outlined
above may be viewed as a threat to such immunity and conse-
quently prohibited by the amendment. However, while one may
disagree upon the desirability of these proposals, there should be
no disagreement with the proposition that the eleventh amend-
ment places no barrier to their implementation.
It has been recognized that there is a tension between the elev-
enth amendment grant of sovereign immunity to the states and
the fourteenth amendment's imposition of duties upon the same
states. Under general principles of construction, since the four-
teenth amendment is the later amendment, there is, to the extent
that any conflict exists, an implicit repeal of the conflicting effects
of the eleventh amendment.
On many occasions these conflicts are not direct conflicts be-
tween the amendments themselves, but rather conflicts between
Congress's attempt to act pursuant to section five of the four-
teenth amendment and the eleventh amendment. The United
States Supreme Court, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,253 indicated that
where there is a clear intent to utilize section five power to im-
pose liability on the states, suits can be brought directly against
the states. 254
The fourteenth amendment was designed to place upon the
states a duty to provide for the protection of citizens. Under the
Fitzpatrick rationale, this direct conflict between the amend-
ments should result in an abrogation of sovereign immunity in
any case in which it would otherwise defeat the victim's litigation
to implement the right to invoke state protection.
Moreover, even if this were not the case, it is clear that the
states themselves can provide for remedies in their own courts
and can waive sovereign immunity for purposes of allowing litiga-
tion in the federal courts. 255 In the event of failure to waive this
should be no limitation on compensation to be recovered. But see IND. CODE § 16-
7-3.6-12(a) (Supp. 1981) ($10,000 limit). For a summary and criticism of this "social
contract" theory for compensation statutes, see Note and Comment, The 1981
Oklahoma Crime Victim Compensation Act, 17 TULSA L.J. 260, 268 (1981).
253. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
254. Id. at 456.
255. Edelman v. Jorden, 415 U.S. 651, 673, reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974)
(quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909) (requiring that
the waiver be made in express language)).
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immunity through state legislation, Congress could, as outlined in
Fitzpatrick, utilize the enforcement power to abrogate sovereign
immunity when it interferes with the principles of fourteenth
amendment protection for inhabitants against unlawful infring-
ment of their rights.
It has, of course, been long established that a suit against indi-
vidual governmental officials is not a suit against the state for
eleventh amendment purposes. 256 It is equally well established
that sovereign immunity does not prohibit injunctive and pro-
spective relief.257 Accordingly, there should be no sovereign im-
munity inhibition to implementing the rights of victims to secure
protection against criminal actions.
Given the fact that liability is predicated upon a negligence
standard, there should also be no absolute official immunity.
However, governments and their officials are recognized to have
at least a qualified immunity, which means that they will have no
liability as long as they are acting in good faith. This should not
make a difference to the outcome of the litigation. The negligence
standard of tort law requiring that the government official act rea-
sonably is the mirror image of the qualified immunity standard.
Consequently, from whatever view the cases are analyzed, there
will be a "good faith" protection for government agencies and
their employees.
XI. CONCLUSION
One of the primary and most important duties of government is
to provide for the physical safety of those under its jurisdiction
and, failing that, for the successful prosecution of those who in-
fringe on that safety. Similarly, one of the most important rights
of all inhabitants of a given political entity is to receive protection,
or, if the government fails to give that protection, to have that
right of protection vindicated by criminal prosecution of the
offender.
In order to implement these rights and duties, the interest and
consequential standing of the victim must be recognized. While
the government cannot do the impossible and should not be con-
sidered to be an "insurer," it should be held responsible for acting
reasonably in attempting to fulfill its duties of protection and
256. E.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
257. Id.
prosecution. In the event of its failure to meet familiar tort stan-
dards of conduct, it should be held responsible to victims, both in
the form of damages for injury and through equitable relief in re-
quiring investigation and prosecution. Such an approach does not
infringe on any right of the government, for it cannot be con-
tended that the government has a "right" to remain passive while
its citizens are victimized or to let those who commit crimes avoid
prosecution. However, this approach does implement basic and
important rights and duties under a regime of law. In the end, by
creating incentive for protection and prosecution, by vindicating
the rights of victims, and by securing the punishment of those
who commit crimes, the government may help secure one of the
most fundamental rights of all: the right not to be a victim.
